[1] The commentators did not explain any overarching intent in this tractate — neither in this chapter nor in any of the other chapters — because in their view the mishnayot within them lack connection and coherence one with another, as I have already informed you.

[2] In this first Mishnah, it was held that Rabbeinu HaKadosh cautioned regarding three matters that are the root and cause of a person's perfection and salvation from harm. The first — that one should weigh one's actions on the scales of reason with respect to what is praiseworthy and what is disgraceful. The second — with respect to the performance of mitzvot and their observance. The third — with respect to beliefs and the foundational principles of the Torah. Regarding the first matter, he teaches that the straight path which every person ought to choose is the middle path between two extremes — as illustrated by the example of generosity, whose extremes are miserliness and wastefulness. Miserliness benefits the person and is good for himself, since it increases the honor of his wealth; yet it causes harm to the poor and destitute, and brings him disgrace in their eyes. Wastefulness brings a person honor in the estimation of others, since they honor him for the good he does them; yet it causes harm to the spendthrift himself, for he will lack bread. Thus both these extremes are harmful and disgraceful — the one in relation to the one who acts, the other in relation to those who receive. Generosity, however, which is the mean, is good for the generous person himself, since he gives as is fitting, and it brings him honor among people. This, then, is the good path — that it is the mean between the extremes — and so too is the matter with all other character traits. It is concerning this that the Mishnah states: "Which is the straight path that a person should choose for himself? Whatever brings honor to the one who does it and honor to him from others" — meaning, that in that path one finds both benefit and honor for the doer himself, and that other people likewise honor him for it. This is indeed the true middle path. It was said that in connection with this, the Gemara in Perek HaMekane in Sotah (5b) states: Whoever sham ("maps out") his ways in this world merits the salvation of the Holy One, blessed is He, as it is written: "And to him who orders his way, I will show the salvation of God" (Tehillim 50:23) — do not read it as ve-sham ("who sets in order") but rather as ve-sham ("who appraises") — meaning, from the language of shuma (appraisal), as the Sages, may their memory be blessed, use it — that a person should weigh and assess all his words and deeds. Some commentators interpret "whatever brings honor to the one who does it" as referring to the Holy One, blessed is He, Who is the Actor and Maker of all mitzvot and all paths — and they explain that a person should, through his actions, be good toward Heaven and good toward his fellow creatures.

[3] The second matter — that he cautioned regarding the mitzvot that one should be as careful with a minor mitzvah as with a weighty one — pertains to positive commandments, for with negative commandments their punishments are spelled out in the text. But with positive commandments, neither the reward nor the punishment for failing to perform them is made explicit, except in the cases of circumcision and the Pesach offering, whose penalty is karet; and from this we learn that their reward is great. He calls a mitzvah "minor" along the lines of what is said in the first chapter of Avodah Zarah (3a): "I have a minor mitzvah, and Sukkah is its name" — and they explain what is meant by a minor mitzvah: one that involves no financial loss. The point is that we should not think to select certain mitzvot and abandon others based on how weighty or trivial they appear to us, for we do not know "the reward granted for each mitzvah," and how then can one compare one mitzvah to another? One might forsake mitzvot that carry a great reward in exchange for whatever one gained by performing them, since the reward of mitzvot lies in the World to Come, of which it is said: "No eye has seen it, O God, but You" (Yeshayahu 64:3). And as it is stated in the chapter of Kohen Gadol (Sanhedrin 21b): Rabbi Yitzchak said — why were the reasons for the mitzvot not revealed? Because in two instances where the reasons were revealed, the greatest man of the world stumbled on account of them. It is written (Devarim 17:17): "He shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn astray," and it is written (Devarim 17:16): "He shall not multiply horses for himself, nor shall he cause the people to return to Egypt." Shlomo said: I will multiply wives and yet not turn astray, and so on — and it is written (Melachim I 11:4): "And it came to pass in Shlomo's old age that his wives turned his heart astray," and it is written: "And the chariot went up and came out of Egypt" (Melachim I 10:29). All of this is to convey the exalted quality and virtue of the mitzvot — and therefore their reasons were not revealed. And this is what is meant by the teaching: "Be as careful with a minor mitzvah as with a weighty one" — as if to say that in the realm of character, one must weigh on the scales of reason the straight path, so that it be balanced and moderate.

[4] In matters of mitzvot, you should make no calculation other than to observe and perform the mitzvot, so that they may come to your hand — the light ones as well as the weighty ones. The only calculation you may make regarding them is in opposition to the yetzer hara — that is, if the performance of a certain mitzvah weighs heavily upon a person because it will bring him great loss, whether in his property or his body, he should reflect that this loss is particular and limited in comparison to the reward that is hoped for in the World to Come. Likewise, if a certain transgression appeals to him for the sake of financial gain or bodily pleasure, he should reflect that such benefit is temporary and particular in comparison to the loss incurred through committing it — for the virtue of the mitzvot and their reward is unknown to us. Praised is He who arranged them, who knows them and is acquainted with them. And when this degraded one — his yetzer hara — confronts him, he should bring this reflection to mind, so that he will be careful to perform all the mitzvot and not take hold of one while abandoning another. It is for this reason that the Sages said (Sukkah 2:4): "One who is engaged in a mitzvah is exempt from another mitzvah" — without distinguishing which mitzvah he is engaged in and which he is not. They likewise said (Shabbat 22b): "One does not pass over mitzvot." This is the clear understanding of what has been written in explanation of this Mishnah.

[5] The Rambam explained "reckon the loss of a mitzvah" as follows: there is a dimension of reflection by which one can determine which mitzvah carries a greater reward — by contemplating the punishment of the negative commandment that corresponds to it. He thus called the loss of a mitzvah "the punishment of the corresponding prohibition." For example: circumcision, the Korban Pesach, resting on the seventh day, and the construction of a parapet are all positive commandments. Yet one who desecrates Shabbat is liable to stoning; one who neglects circumcision or the Korban Pesach in its appointed time is liable to karet; while placing a stumbling block in one's home is a prohibition. From this you may deduce that the reward for resting on Shabbat is greater than the reward for circumcision or the Pesach offering, and that the reward of both of these before Hashem Yitbarach is greater than the reward for building a parapet. This is the meaning of: "Reckon the loss of a mitzvah against its reward." Similarly, he explained "the reward of a transgression" — meaning, when you refrain from committing it, you may learn its reward from its punishment, for a sin whose punishment is severe carries a reward proportionate to that severity when one refrains from committing it, as they said in Kiddushin (39b): whoever sits and does not commit a transgression is given a reward as though he had performed a mitzvah. All of this follows because the Torah, in its negative commandments and their punishments, enumerated eight levels: the greatest, whose punishment is stoning; below it, the second, whose punishment is burning; below it, the third, whose punishment is decapitation; below it, the fourth, whose punishment is strangulation; below it, the fifth, whose punishment is karet; below it, the sixth, whose punishment is death at the hands of Heaven; below it, the seventh, whose punishment is lashes; and the eighth level comprises those prohibitions for which one does not receive lashes. Such is the general thrust of his view.

[6] Although these matters are true with respect to the gradations of transgressions that he mentioned, there is no doubt that our Mishnah did not intend what the Rav explained. For the intention of the Mishnah is that the mitzvot should be equal in our eyes, so that we will strive to perform each and every one of them. And it closed the door with the words: "You do not know the reward of the mitzvot." How, then, could it immediately contradict itself by offering a method for knowing which mitzvah is stringent and which is lenient? Furthermore, according to his explanation, it would have been appropriate to say: "Calculate the reward of a mitzvah against its loss" — for it is the reward that we seek to know. What concern do we have with the loss of a mitzvah? That is not relevant to the matter. Moreover, the greatness of the punishment for a transgression does not necessarily correspond to the greatness of the reward for refraining from it. The Rav himself, in Chapter 41 of Part III of the Moreh HaNevuchim, established a foundational principle regarding the punishments of the Torah: that the severity or leniency of a punishment is determined by four considerations. The first is the gravity of the sin — those actions that cause great harm carry greater punishment. The second is the prevalence of the act — something that occurs frequently requires a severe punishment to deter people from it, whereas something rare requires only a mild punishment. The third is the strength of the temptation — something that a person naturally craves intensely, or to which he is habitually drawn, cannot be deterred except by the fear of a severe punishment. The fourth is the ease with which the act can be concealed — since such acts cannot be prevented except through severe punishment, and so on. The Rav thus clarified in that chapter that the punishments of the Torah were not all calibrated solely according to the gravity and severity of the sin — for that is only one of the four considerations mentioned in the Torah — while all the other considerations serve entirely different purposes, as he explained. How, then, can the reward of a mitzvah be calculated according to the punishment prescribed for its violation, given that the punishment is not always proportionate to the gravity or lightness of the sin? All the more so since most positive commandments have no corresponding prohibitions — how, then, could we derive their reward from the punishment assigned to the prohibitions that correspond to them?

[7] As for what he [the Mishnah] also explained regarding the reward for [refraining from] a transgression as corresponding to its penalty — meaning that the "reward" given for abstaining from a transgression is to be inferred from the punishment for that sin — it is not appropriate to believe that this is the standard measure, such that a person who merely refrains from committing a transgression should receive reward equal to one who actively performs a mitzvah while simply sitting idle. What the Sages said in tractate Kiddushin (Kiddushin 39b) — that one who "sits and does not commit a transgression is given reward as though he had performed a mitzvah" — their intent is that one who suffers from the temptation of a sinful desire that comes within his reach, yet subdues his yetzer hara and does not act upon it, has indeed performed a mitzvah, and its reward is great in proportion to the effort he expends in restraining himself, comparable to one who labors in the performance of a mitzvah. However, this does not mean that one who sits idle acquires reward equivalent to one who actively performs the mitzvah, for absence cannot be equated with presence in terms of the level of actual being. In sum, reason can accept that the reward for performing a positive mitzvah corresponds to the punishment for violating a negative commandment, and that one who refrains from sinning may be granted an abundant reward — even greater than one who performs extensive labor in service.

[8] And behold, one who "sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed" (Bereshit 9:6) — he is put to death; but if he did not shed blood, he does not receive reward in the earthly court. So too is the matter in the Heavenly court. And although there is reward for refraining from violating a negative commandment, there is no doubt that a positive commandment cannot be equated or compared with a negative commandment, nor reward with punishment — all the more so since the Tanna stated: "for you do not know the reward given for the mitzvot." And the Rav will provide a way to understand this, yet that which even the least of Israel truly does not deserve to receive — this has already caused distress to the later authorities. This is the general principle of what was said in the second teaching, which they measured against this Mishnah. And what presents a difficulty according to their view, etc.

[9] The third lesson concerns matters of belief: to reflect upon and know that there is a Supreme Cause that governs all; that the world did not come into being by chance; and that He, may He be exalted, watches over those in the lower realms. The sages also hinted at this in their saying, "Know what is above you" — that a person should contemplate his own lowly station, and that he should place his trust in nothing except in Him, may He be exalted. This is the sum and substance of their teaching.

[10] I have found it fitting to raise certain questions regarding this Mishnah:

[11] The first question is: how could the Mishnah say, "Which is the straight path that a person should choose for himself?" — as though it were in a person's hands to select and choose a path for himself according to his own will? This is not so, for the Torah has already commanded him regarding the established path, and a person has no business choosing any other way, but only to observe and fulfill all the words of the Torah. Our Sages, may their memory be blessed, taught that the Torah itself is called "the path," as it is stated: "And you shall make known to them the path in which they shall walk" (Shemot 18:20).

[12] The second question: How can it be said that the middle path in all things is the good and straight way? For there are matters in which perfection is found at their ultimate extreme, not in their middle — such as the service of, love for, and fear of the Creator. And if you were to say that the Sage spoke only of character traits, though he did not specify this, behold, even regarding them the Tanna states (below, chapter 4): "Be exceedingly humble in spirit."

[13] The third question — why does half of this teaching come in the third person: "that he should choose for himself that which is praiseworthy for the one who performs it and praiseworthy for him from [the perspective of] others," while the other half comes in the second person: "Be careful with a minor mitzvah… for you do not know… reckon the loss of a mitzvah," etc., and "Contemplate three things" — all of which are expressions addressed directly to the reader.

[14] The fourth question — for he saw a contradiction in the words of Rabbi [Yehudah HaNasi]. For Rabbi said: "You do not know the reward given for mitzvot." Yet he also said, apparently in contradiction to this: "Calculate the loss incurred by a mitzvah against its reward." But if "you do not know the reward given for mitzvot," how can one make such a calculation and weigh the reward of a mitzvah — which one does not know — against its loss?

[15] The Fifth Question — How can it possibly enter one's mind that all the mitzvot are equal in their rank, and that we should not exert ourselves in the fulfillment of one more than another? Are we to think that when two different matters present themselves at the same time — such as going to hear the blessing of Kiddushin and answering Amen, or saving those "taken to death" (Mishlei 24:11) or redeeming captives — and we cannot do both simultaneously, that it is not proper to set aside the lesser mitzvah in order to perform the greater one, and that in our eyes the small and the great are equal? Yet the Tanna himself called them "light" and "weighty," and thereby acknowledged in his very words that there is a mitzvah which, by its nature, is weightier than another mitzvah by its nature.

[16] The sixth question — regarding his statement: "Calculate the loss incurred by a mitzvah against its reward." For this seems to contradict the teaching of Antigonus, who said: "Do not be like servants who serve their master for the sake of receiving a reward." If we are not to consider any reward in our service, how then can Rabbi [Yehudah HaNasi] say that the performance of mitzvot should be undertaken with consideration of reward and recompense?

[17] The Seventh Question — regarding the teaching "Contemplate three things," etc. Concerning what it says: "and you will not come to sin" — why did it associate this contemplation specifically with negative commandments rather than positive commandments? For earlier the text spoke of both positive and negative commandments, saying "Be as careful with a minor mitzvah as with a major one" — whether that is to be understood as referring to all of them, or whether it spoke of positive commandments alone. Furthermore, regarding the three things mentioned — "an eye that sees, an ear that hears, and all your deeds are written in a book" — there is reason to question why only these were cited, and why it did not say: a soul that knows, a spirit that speaks, a hand that writes, and similar faculties?

[18] The eighth question: If it is the case that Rabbi [Yehudah HaNasi] presented three distinct teachings drawn from different categories — matters of character, mitzvot, and beliefs — and in the first of them he said, "Which is the straight path that a person should choose for himself?" etc., why did he not introduce the remaining teachings in the same manner? That is, why did he not say, "'He used to say: Be careful with a light mitzvah'"; and "'He used to say: Consider three things'"? This would have followed the customary style used for the varying rulings of the other Tannaim throughout the tractate. And furthermore, why did he encompass all three teachings under the single opening formula of "he used to say," which he mentioned only at the beginning?

[19] And I shall now explain this teaching in a manner that will resolve all the questions:

[20] I have already explained in the first introduction that "Rebbi" refers to Rabbeinu HaKadosh, who is Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi, and why he was given those appellations. After the first chapter recounted the chain of transmission and mentioned the Sages of the Mishnah who received it one from another until the death of Rabbeinu HaKadosh — who committed the received oral commentary to writing in his compilation of the Mishnah — and after that first chapter was dedicated specifically to explaining the words of Shimon HaTzaddik regarding Torah, divine service, and gemilut chasadim, as I have explained, this second chapter was designed to clarify the path by which a person attains perfection in his conduct: whether that path is determined by speculative reason and sound judgment, or by the study of the divine Torah, or whether intellect and religion work in concert. This is the foundation upon which the chapter is built, and the axis around which all of its teachings revolve. This first Mishnah is attributed to Rabbeinu HaKadosh, because he followed in chronological order and in the chain of Torah transmission after his father Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who is mentioned at the end of the first chapter — and thus the teaching of his son, Rebbi, follows after him. Rebbi did not intend in this Mishnah to caution people regarding the conduct of character traits according to political wisdom and philosophical inquiry — seeking the middle path and fleeing from extremes — as the Rambam and all the other commentators supposed. For the Torah has already taught us the straight path in all character traits and the proper limit in their practice, to which nothing is to be added and from which nothing is to be subtracted. A person has no need to seek, through his own reasoning and cleverness, some other path, except that "this Book of the Torah shall not depart from his mouth, so that he may observe and fulfill all that is written in it." Rather, Rebbi's intention was to magnify the greatness of the Torah and its comprehensiveness in all matters that lead to perfection. To this end, he says as follows: a human being, by virtue of being human, when he chooses a straight path for himself along which to conduct his actions, will direct his efforts toward seeking what is seemly and choosing it over what is unseemly. This choice is made either according to his own intellect and judgment — as Shlomo said (Mishlei 21:2): "Every path of a man is straight in his own eyes" — or according to the opinion of others, who serve as the common teachers of all humanity. And this is the meaning of the Mishnah's formulation: "Which is the straight path that a person should choose for himself?" — that is to say, as a human being, without reference to any chosen religion or Torah: it is that which is "a glory to the one who performs it," meaning that in his own eyes it is a beautiful and fitting path by which he conducts himself according to his own judgment. Or it may mean that which is "a glory to him from other people" — the path that all people praise as beautiful and proper. Alternatively, the Mishnah may be interpreted to mean that the praiseworthy deeds a person ought to choose are those that are "a glory to the one who performs it," where that glory belongs to him insofar as he is a person endowed with intellect and understanding — not insofar as he is flesh engaged in eating, drinking, physical intimacy, and matters of the sense of touch, which are a source of shame to him — but rather insofar as those deeds are a glory to him from the side that he is a rational being. In sum: one should choose a path according to reason and judgment, which pertain to him as a human being, and not according to desire, which pertains to him as a mere animal.

[21] And Rabbi said: Behold, this is the ultimate path of human choice for one who is merely human — who has no light of religion and no lamp of Torah. But you, my son, who are called by the name Yisrael, you shall not do so, and you shall not choose the straight path according to intellect and philosophical inquiry — neither according to your own understanding nor according to the understanding of others. Rather, "be as careful with a minor mitzvah as with a major one" (Avot 2:1), for the path of the mitzvot is the straight path that Hashem, may He be blessed, has chosen for perfection — as it is His inheritance, and they require nothing beyond themselves. You should not weigh the path of action according to whether it appears beautiful in your eyes or honorable in the eyes of other people, but solely according to whether it is good in the eyes of Hashem.

[22] How fitting and beautiful are these words, coming from those who themselves embodied them. For Rabbeinu HaKadosh was not perfected solely in the Divine Torah — Written and Oral — but left no branch of Greek, Egyptian, or Chaldean wisdom without mastering it as well. Yet after encompassing all of them, he declared that the perfection attained through the external wisdoms belongs to a person insofar as he is a human being. However, one already finds a higher level still — one that pertains to him insofar as he is part of Israel — in which a perfection is attained through the Torah. Just as a plant has its own particular end, which it achieves through its nutritive power; and a living creature has a higher end still, which it achieves through its life-spirit; and a human being has a yet more distinguished end, which he achieves through his intellect — so too does the people of Israel possess a level even more elevated and an end even more precious, which constitutes their form and essential distinction, as it is said: "And I have separated you from the nations" (Vayikra 20:26) — and this is attained through the Divine Torah and its mitzvot. These truths and teachings he derived from the words of the master of the prophets, as it is said (Devarim 4:5–7): "See, I have taught you statutes and ordinances as Hashem my God commanded me, to do so in the midst of the land to which you are coming to possess it"; "And you shall observe and perform them, for this is your wisdom and your understanding in the eyes of the nations who shall hear all these statutes"; "And they shall say: Only a wise and understanding people is this great nation — for what great nation is there that has a God so near to it..." — "and what great nation is there that has statutes and ordinances as righteous as all of this Torah?" — as I have explained in those verses in their proper place. In agreement with this, Dovid peace be upon him declared, when charging his son Shlomo: "Guard the charge of Hashem your God, to walk in His ways and to keep His statutes, His commandments, His ordinances, and His testimonies, as written in the Torah of Moshe, so that you may prosper in all that you do and in all that you turn to" (Melachim I 2:3). The intent of "in all that you turn to" is that one should not imagine the Torah to be lacking anything of the good learning found in the [other] wisdoms — for whatever matter or knowledge one turns to and seeks there, he will find it within the Torah. As the Sages said (below, Chapter 5): "Turn it over and turn it over, for everything is in it." Indeed, one can see that in the matter of courage, generosity, love of one's fellow, fear of sin, justice, and all the other praiseworthy character traits — the Torah commanded them all, and commanded the proper mean among them as befits each one. It was for this reason that Rabbeinu HaKadosh counseled: although a human being, insofar as he is a human being, might seek his path according to his own intellect, we for our part shall conduct ourselves by none other than the Torah.

[23] Reflect carefully on this teaching, for it does not say that a person should make no distinction between one mitzvah and another — performing the weightier one before the lighter one on account of its greater gravity. Rather, it says: "Be as careful with a light mitzvah as with a weighty one." The intent is that beyond the mere performance and fulfillment of the mitzvot, a person must also bring to their observance diligence and alacrity. This refers to what is said there regarding the eagerness, love, and joy one should bring to the performance of mitzvot — for that which a person does with great desire and great joy, he will naturally be careful to do well. Therefore, the teaching states that whether the mitzvah that comes his way is light or weighty, he should always perform whatever mitzvot he does with great alacrity, eagerness, and joy. The Tanna thus acknowledges in this teaching that there are indeed mitzvot that are light and mitzvot that are weighty in their nature. Yet he does not say to neglect the lighter one in order to perform the weightier one. Rather, he says that every mitzvah one performs — whether light or weighty — should be done with alacrity and great desire, as the Tanna likewise says elsewhere (below, Chapter 4): "Run to perform even a light mitzvah" — meaning that even if a mitzvah is a light one, one should fulfill it with swiftness and alacrity. And the reason given for this is: "for you do not know the reward given for the mitzvot." My understanding of this is that we do not know whether reward for mitzvot is granted on account of the act of the mitzvah itself — as some of the rabbinic authors maintain — or whether reward is granted on account of the eagerness, joy, and delight a person experiences in performing the mitzvot, as held and argued by Rav ibn Chasday. Since we do not know the true resolution of this question, it is fitting that we strive in both matters together — that is, in the fulfillment and performance of the mitzvot, and in performing them with great care and great delight. This, then, is the meaning of the phrase: "for you do not know the reward given for the mitzvot" — that is, whether the reward is granted for the act itself, or for the alacrity and delight that accompanies it.

[24] The Torah has already warned regarding both matters — concerning the performance of the mitzvot themselves, as it states numerous times: "And you shall observe to do as Hashem your God has commanded you" (Devarim 5:29); and "This is the commandment, the statutes and the ordinances that Hashem your God commanded to teach you, to do" (Devarim 6:1). Regarding diligence and joy, it states (Devarim 28:47): "Because you did not serve Hashem your God with joy and with a glad heart" — indicating that joy, which is the very essence of diligence, is an intrinsic condition of the performance of mitzvot. Concerning both together, Dovid, peace be upon him, said (Tehillim 19:12): "Also Your servant is careful in them; in keeping them there is great reward." The word "also" was not said to include Dovid, but rather to include diligence — as if to say: in the performance of mitzvot, "Your servant" likewise is careful in them, meaning in the mitzvot mentioned above, "in keeping them," since thereby there is "great reward." That is to say, through the combination of diligence together with the observance and performance of mitzvot, the reward and recompense will be far greater than it would be through performance without diligence. And since perhaps the inclination of man's heart is evil from his youth, it may prevent him from this when he sees that in performing the mitzvah his money will be lost or his body will suffer. Therefore it was said in response to this: "Calculate the loss incurred by a mitzvah against its reward." That is to say, we should reckon the value of the loss that follows from the performance of a mitzvah — which is as nothing and void, given how vast and everlasting the reward that reaches the soul from it — just as a person should reckon the gain and benefit that accrue to his property and bodily pleasure from the commission of a transgression, which are like the gourd plant "that came into being in a night and perished in a night" (Yonah 4:10), against the loss that its commission brings upon his soul. For the ultimate reward and loss are measured in relation to the soul, in terms of its greatness and eternity, while material goods and evils are "vanity; a work of delusion — in the time of their reckoning they shall perish" (Yirmiyahu 10:15). And even though no person knows the precise reward given for the mitzvot, it was nevertheless stated: "Calculate the loss incurred by a mitzvah against its reward" — because although we do not know how great the reward for each individual mitzvah is, we do know that the reward of mitzvot does not exist in this world, and that the true reward is for the soul in the World of Souls, which is immeasurably greater than any material good, to the point that material good is nearly incomparable to it. This is as the Sages expounded regarding the verse (Yeshayahu 64:3): "No eye has seen, O God, but You" etc. Along these same lines, Shlomo said (Mishlei 20:17): "Bread of falsehood is sweet to a man, but afterward his mouth will be filled with gravel."

[25] Now, Antigonus said that we should not serve Hashem Yitbarach "in order to receive a reward," and Rabbi [Yehudah HaNasi] did not disagree with him. Rather, he said that when that vile one — the Satan, the yetzer hara — confronts a person and places before him the reward that comes from transgression, and the loss that comes from performing the mitzvah, whether the spiritual loss or the spiritual punishment as well, then by means of this reflection one can cool its fury and send it away with a response. It follows, therefore, that during the proper performance of one's service to Hashem, one need not place before oneself any consideration of reward or of the future. However, when that adversary and its thoughts overpower a person, he should reflect on the spiritual reward and punishment in order to drive away its temptation from himself. From all this you should also understand that Rabbi did not speak of the material reward that Antigonus mentioned, but rather of the reward that is spiritual.

[26] Now, what follows — "contemplate three things" — is not an independent matter, but rather a completion of the preceding teaching. For having said "reckon the loss of a mitzvah against its reward," it became necessary to add that no doubt should arise in one's heart concerning the reward and punishment he had mentioned; rather, one should always contemplate and keep before one's eyes that there is, above him, "an eye that sees and an ear that hears" — which is an allusion to Divine individual Providence. By means of this awareness, one will not come to transgression, which here refers to heresy and corrupt thinking regarding Providence, for this is what is called "transgression" in this context — namely, heretical thought. It is for this reason that the text says "and you will not come to the hands of transgression," alluding to false belief, and does not speak of distancing oneself from the negative commandments. Now, since the categories of human action encompass three types — the category of thoughts and matters of the heart, the category of spoken words, and the category of practical deeds — the mishnah therefore states that Divine knowledge encompasses all of them. It says "an eye that sees" — corresponding to thoughts, as it is written (Shmuel I 16:7): "but Hashem looks upon the heart," for the human eye is not truly a seeing eye, inasmuch as it perceives only the surface of a thing and not its inner reality. The Divine eye, however, is truly a seeing eye, for it searches hearts and minds. And corresponding to spoken words, it says:

[27] "And an ear that hears" — meaning, whatever proceeds from your mouth is made known before Hashem, Lord of Hosts. And corresponding to physical actions, he says: "And all your deeds are recorded in a book" — meaning they are perceived before Him, for there is no forgetting. All of this has already been found in the Torah: "See, I have seen" (Bereshit 1:31), "And Hashem saw," "And Hashem said," "And Hashem heard" — "I have heard the murmurings of the children of Yisrael" (Shemot 16:12). And Moshe, peace be upon him, said (Shemot 32:32): "from Your book which You have written." Behold, with what I have explained, all the questions have been resolved, and we have come to understand that the passage is interconnected and unified.