[1] A questioner may already raise a question regarding these statements of the pairs (*Zugot*): that sometimes they speak about the advocates before the judges, and sometimes they speak directly to the judges themselves. And what is the connection between these statements and those that preceded them? What is fitting to say in this regard is that these two of the pairs were the leaders of the fourth generation of the Sages of the Mishnah, and that they came to limit the statements of Yehoshua ben Perachya and Nittai of Arbel, their teachers. For since Yehoshua ben Perachya had said, "Judge every person favorably," his student Yehudah ben Tabbai came to clarify that this statement should not be understood as a universal rule applying to every person — that one should judge even someone who could be judged as either righteous or wicked as favorably as possible. For if one were to do so, a person would resemble the advocates before the judges — those who speak and arrange the arguments of the litigants before the court — who always each declare that their own client is in the right and that justice is on their side. This is a reprehensible act: to vindicate the wicked and to condemn the righteous. Some commentators explain "advocates before the judges" to mean the persons appointed to arrange and appoint judges for the community, each of whom wishes to appoint his relative or his friend, praises him effusively, and recalls nothing to his discredit — always judging him favorably.

[2] The Torah already distanced us from this trait [of judging unfavorably] in what it says: "Distance yourself from falsehood" (Shemot 23:7), and in what it says: "They shall acquit the righteous and condemn the wicked" (Devarim 25:1). Shlomo said: "He who says to the wicked, 'You are righteous' — peoples shall curse him, nations shall condemn him" (Mishlei 24:24). And the prophet said: "Woe to those who call evil good and good evil" (Yeshayahu 5:20). Having shown that it is not appropriate to judge every person favorably with respect to all categories of people, the text goes on to clarify that it is likewise not appropriate in all circumstances. To demonstrate that there are times when it is not fitting to judge every person favorably, the teaching brings the case of litigants standing before a court: if the judge were to judge them favorably, he would simply believe their words without properly investigating and examining the truth of the matter. Therefore, it is fitting that when litigants stand before him, the judge should regard them as wicked — he should neither believe the claims of the plaintiff nor the defenses of the defendant, but rather he should thoroughly investigate and probe the full truth of the matter. In such a situation, then, it is not appropriate to judge every person favorably. Yet there does come a time when it is proper to judge both of them favorably — namely, when they depart from before the judge having accepted the ruling upon themselves. At that point, one ought not to say that the plaintiff brought his claim deceitfully or that the defendant falsely denied his fellow's claim, for perhaps what they did was done in error — for instance, they may not have known the law, or the plaintiff may have brought his claim in good faith according to his own understanding, and the defendant may have denied it due to forgetfulness rather than malicious intent. Since in the end they accepted the ruling, it is then proper to judge them both favorably. The text has thus clarified that Yehoshua ben Perachya's teaching, "Be one who judges every person favorably," does not apply equally to every person — neither the righteous nor the wicked — nor does it apply at every moment. In a similar vein, the Sages said (Kiddushin 34a): "One does not derive [laws] from general statements" — and this too was derived from the words of the Torah itself, as the verse states: "The matter of both of them shall come before God [the judges]; whomever God condemns..." (Shemot 22:8). Regarding lashes, the Torah says: "He shall not add [beyond the prescribed number] to strike him — to strike him beyond these with a great blow, lest your brother be degraded before your eyes" (Devarim 25:3). I once raised the question in connection with that passage: why does the verse call any additional blow "a great blow," rather than the forty lashes of the prescribed flogging? I answered that the reason is as follows: when a sinner receives the lashes prescribed by the Torah, he emerges cleansed of all guilt and wrongdoing, pure and free of transgression, for his sins have departed from him through those lashes. Therefore, once he stands pure and clean of all wickedness, even a single additional blow becomes, in his regard, a grave and deeply shameful blow — as though a distinguished and innocent man who had never sinned in his life were being flogged. For it is well known that if a righteous and blameless man who has never sinned were to receive lashes in a court — even a single blow — it would be a lasting humiliation and an indelible wound, commensurate with his righteousness and integrity. So too, one who has been flogged and completed his punishment remains thereafter innocent and pure; hence any additional lash constitutes a great blow and a great disgrace. Our Sages, may their memory be blessed, already pointed to this reason (Megillah 7b) in their comment on the verse: "lest your brother be degraded before your eyes" (Devarim 25:3) — once he has been degraded, he is again as your brother — in full accord with the teaching of this Sage.

[3] "When they depart from before you, let them be in your eyes as innocent" — for they have already accepted the judgment upon themselves. Yet a question may still be raised against this: perhaps the litigants are cunning, and the judge may be unable to draw words from them or uncover the truth — in that case, what is the benefit of regarding them as innocent? Therefore Shimon ben Shetach said: "Be thorough in examining the witnesses," for he comes as one who supports, adds to, and completes the words of his colleague Yehudah ben Tabai — in that multiplying the examination of witnesses means asking them various questions to see whether they hold firm in their testimony. He further warns that the judge must be careful in conducting that examination and questioning, lest through it the witnesses learn to lie in their testimony. The judge must therefore be shrewd, acting with wisdom in such a way that he brings forth a truthful verdict. Our Sages of blessed memory have cautioned extensively (Sanhedrin 40a) regarding the investigation and examination of witnesses, and the root of all this comes in the Torah in the verse (Devarim 13:15): "And you shall inquire, and investigate, and ask thoroughly." It is also possible to interpret the words of Shimon ben Shetach differently — not as coming to support and add to the words of his colleague Yehudah ben Tabai, but rather as coming to clarify and limit the words of his teacher Nittai of Arbel, who said: "Do not associate with a wicked person." Shimon ben Shetach is teaching that this should not be understood as a universal rule, for there are times when it is proper to associate with a wicked person, and this is justified in the case of a judge — in order to multiply the examination of the witnesses, for if the judge does not engage with both the righteous and the wicked, and does not draw out much speech and questioning from them, how will he ever know the truth?

[4] Behold, then, these two Sages — Yehudah ben Tabai and Shimon ben Shatach — came to explain the words of their teachers, and both of them elucidated the law of the Torah and the nature of judicial proceedings, which constitute one dimension of the Torah. And perhaps they intended to clarify matters that pertain to the relationship between one person and another, which corresponds to the third pillar mentioned by Shimon HaTzaddik, known as gemilut chasadim.