Parasha: Vayikra · Aliyah: First (Chesed)

ויקרא אל משה, וידבר, He called out to Moses and spoke, etc. According to Torat Kohanim on this verse G'd always called to Moses before He addressed him from the Tent of Testimony. We have to explore why the Torah records such a call on three separate occasions instead of allowing us to conclude that if it was stated once it would form the basis of a Mah Matzinu type of exegesis, i.e. that just as G'd called to Moses on the occasion mentioned here, or elsewhere, so He did on every other occasion He spoke to him from the Tent of Testimony. The author of Torat Kohanim proceeds to explain why such an exegesis could not be applied: "There are only two other occasions when this "call" is recorded as having preceded the דבור, the speech. The first time it occurred when Moses had the vision at the burning bush; the second time was at Mount Sinai, and the third time is here. We cannot establish a common denominator between these three occurrences as at the burning bush Moses had never previously been addressed by G'd and there was a need to prepare him mentally for such an address. At Mount Sinai (Exodus 19,3) G'd wanted Moses to convey His message to the entire Jewish nation. Neither of these two instances could serve as a valid precedent for G'd addressing Moses out of the Tabernacle on earth after having issued a "call." The reason that even this latter occasion does not serve as a precedent for the other two occasions is that in both other instances G'd had manifested Himself out of fire as opposed to the present occasion.

According to Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi, the source for the Torat Kohanim saying that the call at Mount Sinai came out of the fire is either Exodus 24,16: "G'd called to Moses on the seventh day," or Exodus 19,20 where the Torah writes: "G'd called Moses to (come up to) the top of the Mountain." It cannot be Exodus 19,3 where the Torah writes: "G'd called to him from the Mountain, etc." This follows the explanation of Rabbenu Hillel according to whom this latter verse was not addressed to Moses out of the fire and the Torat Kohanim has stated that the reason the three occasions cannot serve as precedent for one another is that at Sinai and at the burning bush G'd called out of the fire. Thus far Rabbi Mizrachi. With all due respect to Rabbi Mizrachi, the Rabbi was not quite exact in his observation. The premise of the Torat Kohanim was that inasmuch as the word ויקרא is followed by the word דבור, we should have been able to deduce that what happened at the burning bush also happened at the Tabernacle seeing that we have a gezeyrah shaveh, the use by the Torah of similar wording. When we follow this principle the word ויקרא should have been dispensed with in at least one of the three situations. I believe the proof is precisely from Exodus 19,3. The verse in Exodus 24,16 does not contain a single superfluous word as it serves as G'd's call for Moses to come up to the Mountain and to spend there the next forty days. The word ויקרא in that verse is used instead of the word דבור not in addition to it. The only verses which were of interest to Torat Kohanim are the verses in which the word קריאה is used as a prelude to the word דבור. Even the verse in Exodus 24,16 does not really meet the criteria established by the author of Torat Kohanim as G'd had to issue a call to Moses to ascend the Mountain seeing he was down below. The word ויקרא is certainly not superfluous then. That particular קריאה, call, could only have served as a prelude to G'd speaking to Moses on the Mountain. Had it been omitted, we would have assumed that G'd spoke to Moses while the latter was at the base of the Mountain, something impossible as the Torah itself testifies that G'd spoke to Moses while the latter was on top of the Mountain.

As far as Rabbi Mizrachi finding support for his theory in Exodus 24,16 where G'd called out to Moses on the seventh day out of the cloud before addressing him in the subsequent verses in 25,1-2 is concerned, the venerable Rabbi has forgotten that the verses 24,17-18 which do not involve G'd's addressing Moses make it impossible to consider 25,1-2 as a continuation of His call to Moses in 24,16. There is absolutely no evidence that what G'd said to Moses in 25,1-2 occurred prior to Moses' ascending the Mountain. G'd may have given Moses all the instructions concerning the donations for the Tabernacle after the latter had already been on the Mountain for a number of days.

Rabbi Mizrachi rejected the opinion of Rabbenu Hillel that seeing the call at the Tabernacle in our verse was in lieu of G'd manifesting Himself out of the "fire" (seeing the divine fire had not yet descended on the altar). Accordingly, the Torah had to record G'd's call here. We cannot accept this argument either. Rabbi Mizrachi apparently thought that Torat Kohanim presumed that the "call" at the burning bush and at Mount Sinai was accompanied by Heavenly fire. This is not true. The author of Torat Kohanim only meant that the particular appearances by G'd to Moses were also followed or preceded by G'd manifesting Himself through fire, something that most certainly was not the case when G'd called to Moses here at the Tabernacle. G'd manifesting Himself through fire is an additional dimension to the degree of His manifestation and did not take the place of His "call" alerting the recipient of such a vision that he would shortly be addressed by G'd. Seeing that no such fiery manifestation took place in the encounter between G'd and Moses at the Tabernacle, it was important to record that G'd drew Moses' attention to an impending message by means of this "call."

The author proceeds to insist that the principal proof that G'd always let the "call" precede His speaking to Moses is from Exodus 24,16. [I have abbreviated the polemics somewhat in the interests of brevity. Ed.]

I find it difficult to understand the comment in Torat Kohanim that seeing that when G'd spoke to Moses at Mount Sinai this was something public, addressed to the whole nation, and that this is why He needed to introduce His address by a "call. After all, every commandment G'd revealed to Moses by speaking to him was intended for the whole nation. The author of Korban Aharon claims that when G'd addressed the whole of Israel He had to reduce the intensity of His voice seeing the people were not attuned to Him to the same degree as Moses. Accordingly, if the Torah uses the the word ויקרא here it is to tell us that G'd did not reduce the intensity of voice He used when He addressed the people at large instead of only Moses. If we follow this approach we would have to understand the author of Torat Kohanim as saying that when he speaks about לכל ישראל he did not consider this as a compliment to Israel. This is quite difficult to accept. I believe that the מעלה, compliment, expressed by the word ויקרא in Exodus 24,16 consisted in the fact that G'd included the whole of the people in what He was about to say instead of using Moses as His intermediary. The author of Torat Kohanim took the example of Exodus 24,16 as his cue to tell us that just as G'd employed the "call" as a compliment to the people at that time„ He continued to use this "call" forthwith as a compliment to Moses, even though He addressed Himself to the ears of Moses alone.

The Torat Kohanim we have quoted above concludes by saying that this call not only preceded addresses by G'd to Moses which were followed by the relatively harsh דבור, but included every time G'd spoke to Moses from the Tabernacle even when employing the softer אמירה, or the word צו, "command." The proof lies in the repetition of the word וידבר in verse one, followed immediately by the word דבר at the beginning of verse two although no message had been delivered yet as a result of either the words ויקרא or the word וידבר. Seeing no such apparently superfluous verbiage occurred either during the Torah's report of the vision of the burning bush or when G'd communicated with Moses at Mount Sinai, all we could have deduced from those occasions is that a "call" always preceded a דבור. We needed this verse and its unusual construction to teach us that such a "call" preceded every communication Moses received from G'd at the Tabernacle. In the other two instances G'd's appearances in that location were restricted to a single communication such as at the burning bush or to a communication extending over a few days such as immediately before the revelation at Mount Sinai. "Calls" reported on those occasions could not have served as precedents for G'd "calling" Moses every time He spoke to him from the Tabernacle, something that became a frequent occurrence during the next 38 years. The first such occasion therefore had to be introduced by the words "from the Tent of Testimony," in order to demonstrate that this form of communication set a pattern for future communications by G'd to Moses which emanated from the Tabernacle. In this instance the previously mentioned method of exegesis מה מצינו, could be employed as there would not be new and different factors governing G'd's speaking to Moses in the future. The Torat Kohanim needed to address the problem of the nature of G'd's addresses, i.e. the various terms the Torah employs when reporting that G'd spoke to Moses. The author wanted to establish proof that when G'd commenced speaking to Moses and the Torah describes this as ויאמר השם, or ויצו, that such communications were also preceded by a "call" to Moses. Torat Kohanim repeats once more that in view of the repeated use of the word דבר or the very fact that the term דבר reflects a "stronger" speech, I would have thought that only that type of speech was preceded by a "call." Therefore, to ensure that we do not misread the Torah, the Torah wrote דבר ידבר, to include all kinds of addresses by G'd as having been preceded by a קריאה, a "call."

I have seen that Rabbi Abraham ben David, (ראב"ד) quotes a version of the Torat Kohanim according to which the proof is contained in the words "דבר, וידבר, לאמור" occurring consecutively in our verse. This version makes much more sense than the one I am quoting from which does not strictly conform to the text in the Torah. According to that version, Torat Kohanim used the word לאמור which was unnecessary seeing that the word דבר followed immediately. Actually, the word לאמור would not have been extraneous at all; the Torah is full of constructions such as וידבר…לאמור. What is extraneous is the repetition of the words וידבר…דבר. We must consider the text of the Torat Kohanim at the disposal of the ראב"ד as the authentic one.

I must add that as far as the Torat Kohanim proving that the word ויקרא in our verse is indispensable is concerned as we could not have assumed that such a call preceded G'd's communications to Moses from other instances such as the burning bush, etc., the fact is that the word is absolutely necessary regardless of the arguments advanced. How else would I have known that G'd's "call" preceded all other communications to Moses from the Tent of Testimony barring the first one were it not for that word?

We must, however, pay closer attention to the text of the Torat Kohanim. Why did that author not question the word ויקרא as being superfluous in either the appearance of G'd at the burning bush or at Mount Sinai in conjunction with a "call," so that we could have deduced that such a call had taken place by deducing this from what happened when G'd spoke to Moses from the Tabernacle? The problem that the Torat Kohanim posed by saying that a combination of the use by the Torah of the word ויקרא either at the burning bush and at Sinai, or at the Tent of Testimony and at Sinai would not have served as a precedent to teach us concerning the third ocurrence would then not have to be raised at all. Furthermore, seeing that Torat Kohanim used the extraneous words מאהל מועד to prove that all subsequent communications from the Tabernacle were preceded by "calls," what is to stop him from applying that למוד also to what happened at Sinai and at the burning bush, so that the word ויקרא in both of those instances would be superfluous?

I have read the commentary of Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi who was very aware of all these problems, but I must confess that I do not feel that his answers put my mind at rest. The venerable Rabbi argues that the reason that G'd had to record the call as preceding His speaking to Moses at the Tent was that Moses was afraid to enter unless invited. (The Torah had described the Tent as filled with G'd's cloud of glory and Moses being unable to enter in Exodus 40,35.) In other words, the reason for the call there was that it could not serve as precedent for G'd's need to "call" either at the burning bush or at Sinai. Why would the author of Torat Kohanim have been afraid to point out something as simple as that? I believe that had the Torah omitted mention of the word קריאה either at the burning bush or at Sinai, I simply would have considered the קריאה here as something new which had not occurred previously instead of assuming it had occurred without the Torah having mentioned it. [At this point the author continues in his polemic against the conclusions offered by Rabbi Mizrachi. The interested reader is referred to the original for further study. Ed.]

ויקרא אל משה. He called to Moses. Why did the Torah not identify the caller? While it is true that the Torah identifies the caller as being G'd when it goes on to say: "G'd spoke to him from the Tent of Testimony," the omission of G'd as the subject at the beginning of this verse is most remarkable.

Perhaps the Torah wanted to let us know the essence of G'd's "voice" which is such that even if it called extremely loudly it would be audible only to someone attuned to it and waiting to hear it. The words ויקרא אל משה, must mean that although G'd called out generally, only Moses heard it and not any other person standing in front of him [i.e. closer to the source of the voice. Ed.] Had the Torah written: "G'd called to Moses, etc.," I would have understood that G'd called out in a powerful voice but that by the time the sound-waves reached the ear of Moses they were considerably weaker than at their source. Moses would then have had to gauge by the volume of sound he heard from where that sound had emanated. He would also not have been surprised that people standing behind him had not heard that voice at all seeing those people were even further removed from the origin of that sound than he himself. At any rate, there would not have been any miraculous element in this call by G'd to Moses out of the Tabernacle. By writing ויקרא אל משה, the Torah draws our attention to the fact that Moses indeed heard a very powerful voice and that the super-natural element in this call was that he was the only one who heard it.

Another reason why the name of G'd was not recorded in the Torah as associated with this "call" was that G'd was more interested in having His name associated with the commandments He was about to give to Moses than merely to record that it was His voice which invited Moses to receive a communication from Him, or as a sign of G'd showing him respect, if we want to adopt the approach of Vayikra Rabbah 1,8. According to that Midrash, Aaron, his sons and the elders had been wondering who was most beloved in G'd's eyes; They decided amongst themselves that they would find out by observing to whom G'd would turn first after the Tabernacle [Aaron's domain Ed.] was erected. When G'd called to Moses they realised that G'd liked Moses best of all. There was no cause for the Torah to mention Moses by name as the test was the call itself.

By following the approach of the Midrash we can also understand why the Torah had to add the word אל משה instead of merely saying: אליו, "to him," seeing that Moses' name had appeared at the end of the last portion (Exodus 40,35). The Torah could have done the same as in Genesis 18,1 where we are told: "G'd appeared to him" (Abraham), without mentioning Abraham's name seeing he had been the subject of the last paragraph in Parshat Lech Lecha. In our situation G'd had to convince the sons of Aaron and the elders of His fondness for Moses.

וידבר ה׳ אליו מאהל מועד. G'd spoke to him out of the Tent of Testimony. The reason that the Torah had to emphasise that G'd spoke only to Moses, i.e. that only Moses heard His voice, was to prevent misunderstandings. While it was understandable that the ordinary people did not hear G'd's voice, we could have thought that any priest inside the Tabernacle who had business there at the time G'd wished to address Moses would be privy to hearing G'd's voice. The Torah therefore emphasised that only Moses was privy to this voice by writing אליו, "to him exclusively."

מאהל מועד, from the Tent of Testimony, etc. Why didn't the Torah first mention the site from which G'd's voice emanated before telling us who did the talking? Here the Torah reverses the norm completely by first telling us to whom the voice spoke, then telling us who did the speaking and only at the very end telling us from where G'd's voice emanated. When we consider the comments of Torat Kohanim which we quoted earlier, i.e. that all of G'd's communications from the Tent of Testimony were preceded by a call to Moses, it does make sense that this information was reserved for the end of the verse. Matters which will occur at a later stage deserve to be mentioned later than those which occur in the immediate future.

Torat Kohanim also deduces from the wording of this verse that G'd's voice was "cut off, and did not travel beyond the confines of the Tabernacle." How could this be deduced from our verse seeing Torat Kohanim had already deduced the nature of the "call" from the same wording? Furthermore, if indeed the voice of G'd did not travel beyond the confines of the Tabernacle, why did the Torah have to word things in such a way that we learn that the Israelites could not hear this voice? Of course they could not hear a voice which was confined to the Tabernacle! I have seen that Rabbi Mizrachi answers this problem saying that the exegesis is based on the Torah not writing: ויקרא אל משה מאהל מועד, but writing instead: אליו מאהל מועד. The meaning is that the voice travelled in a straight line from the Tabernacle to Moses and stopped there. Our second question is answered by the ראב"ד who says that the Torah had to tell us that the voice of G'd being audible only to Moses was something new; previously it was either audible to the people who were assembled at Mount Sinai, or in the case of the burning bush, it would have been audible had there been anyone else present beside Moses. It was only after G'd took up residence in the Tabernacle that His voice reached only Moses.

I must confess that I am not happy with either one of these two answers. As to the argument of Rabbi Mizrachi that the mention of the words מאהל מועד at the end of the verse after אליו indicates that the voice came directly to Moses and not to the people, how do we know where exactly Moses stood at that time? If Moses had stood in a spot adjoining the Tent of Testimony, the fact that no one else heard the voice does not prove they would not have heard it if he had stood some distance away. If Rabbi Mizrachi is correct, the voice should have been mentioned first followed by its objective, i.e. מאהל מועד אליו. The fact that the Torah writes the word אליו first makes it plain that it was not the Torah's intention to convey to us the exclusivity of G'd's voice by means of this wording. Why would the Torah reverse the normal syntax by telling us the end before the beginning? It is much easier to accept that the Torah imparts the information about G'd's voice being נפסק, cut off, from the sequence "מאהל מועד לאמור," instead of the sequence "וידבר ה׳ מאהל מועד אליו לאמור." If the Torah had not intended for us to deduce the various למודים, the rules of syntax would have required the Torah to first identify the place the speaker spoke from, followed by the identification of whom it spoke to. Now that the Torah did not do so, we have "room," i.e. a sufficient number of departures from the norm to allow for all the deductions we have been taught by Torat Kohanim. The additional words מאהל מועד teach that from that time onwards a "call" preceded every communication by G'd to Moses. The word לאמור may be used to include not only those communications by G'd which used the word דבר. The fact that the Torah did not write ויקרא מאהל מועד attests to the nature of G'd's voice, i.e. that only Moses was attuned to it. The sequence מאהל מועד לאמור teaches that the voice emanated from the Tabernacle, i.e. וידבר, and travelled only as as far as Moses and was not heard outside.

As to the ראב"ד's answer to our second question that the Torah had to exclude previous calls which emanated from G'd as not having been exclusively for Moses' ears, and that this is why the Torah had to write the words מאהל מועד where it did, his words are nothing short of astounding. Surely the Torah had provided us with the words אהל מועד both in Exodus 25,22 and in Numbers 7,89. In both these instances G'd's voice is reported as emanating from the Tabernacle or a certain spot within it. Why would the ראב"ד need the words מאהל מועד in our verse to teach us such an exclusion? It is therefore much more plausible to believe that what Torat Kohanim focused on was not that the voice was cut off inside the Tabernacle but that the communication, i.e. the speech, the דבור was audible only inside the Tabernacle. When G'd called, i.e. invited Moses, His voice was audible outside the Sanctuary. When He spoke to Moses (after the latter had entered the Sanctuary), His voice was audible only to Moses, i.e. it was נפסק.

Rabbi Mizrachi opines that the author of Torat Kohanim clearly holds that Moses was inside the Tabernacle at that time and that this was only possible because the cloud had withdrawn at that time. [It is assumed that the readers are familiar with a Tannaitic disagreement as to whether Moses was inside the Tabernacle when G'd spoke with him at this point or not. Please refer to Exodus 40,35 where the Torah told us that Moses could not enter the Tabernacle due to the cloud containing the glory of G'd filling the Tabernacle. Some opinions (Yuma 4) hold that G'd took hold of Moses and placed him inside the Tent. On the other hand we have Numbers 7,89 from which it is evident that G'd spoke to Moses while he was inside the Tabernacle. Rabbi Mizrachi, based on Rashi, holds that the solution to the apparent contradiction in the verses we quoted is in the words "because G'd's cloud rested upon it" (Exodus 40,35); once the cloud moved Moses was able to enter. Ed.] We also find that Moses was able to "enter the cloud" in Exodus 24,18. The same may be presumed to have occurred in connection with this "call" in our verse here. As far as I am concerned the matter is very simple as it is not reasonable to assume that Moses had to wait until the cloud removed itself fom the Tabernacle and that Moses heard the call only then. Upon examination you will find that Rabbi Mizrachi quoted the text of the first part of Torat Kohanim 1,9 (The Midrash refers to Exodus 25,22 where G'd told Moses He would henceforth communicate with him inside the Tent of Meeting, G'd's voice emanating from between the cherubs which were situated on the lid of the Holy Ark): "When G'd said: 'I will communicate with you there,' He meant to exclude the Israelites who had not been deemed fit to ascend Mount Sinai; He also meant to exclude everybody else including Aaron, barring the ministering angels. Moses could not enter the Tabernacle until he had been summoned. This proves that at the time G'd called to him (in our verse) Moses was standing outside. The Torah writes that the voice came אליו, to him, i.e. from the inside of the Tabernacle and was cut off." Thus far the quote from Torat Kohanim. It is clear that the author of that Midrash was convinced that Moses stood outside the Tabernacle at the time G'd's voice called him. You may ask "how did the author of that Midrash know that the call preceded the communication (i.e. the substance of what G'd wanted to say)?" Seeing that the "call" was needed to invite Moses into the Tabernacle as he was afraid to enter unless summoned, how can we derive any additional למוד, exegetical content, from this word? The answer is that if G'd had wanted to He could have removed Moses' fear and he would have entered the Tabernacle without a special "call." Seeing G'd did not do this, this is proof that the "call" was something that had to precede the communication proper as we have outlined previously, and that Moses remained afraid to enter without invitation. He stationed himself close to the Tabernacle so as to be mentally prepared as soon as he would receive G'd's "call" at which time he would enter the Tent. The sound of the call to Moses "left" (was audible beyond) the Tabernacle, whereas the sound of G'd's communication to Moses never left the confines of the Tabernacle and thus was not heard by anybody else. Not even an echo of it was audible [as had been during the last eight commandments at Mount Sinai. Ed.].

A moral-ethical approach to our verse sees in it a message to Moses to relate to the Israelites everything G'd would command him while he was still in the Tabernacle. This is the deeper reason why the text wrote the words מאהל מועד לאמור, "from the Tent of Testimony to say," in that order. There is a sound psychological reason for this. If the Israelites would hear G'd's commandments as emanating from the Tabernacle, it would inspire them to relate to them with far more reverence than if Moses were merely to tell them these commandments while assembling the people inside the camp. They would accept these commandments knowing that Moses would not have dared to add or omit a single word while he was communicating G'd's word at a place where the שכינה was present.

There is yet another message contained in the words אליו מאהל מועד. Moses merited being called by G'd and addressed by Him as a sign that G'd had forgiven the sin of the golden calf and had taken up residence within the Tabernacle to signify this forgiveness. G'd wanted Moses to communicate this message to Israel. This is why the Torah wrote: "from the Tent of Meeting to say." When you find that Torat Kohanim interprets the substance of the message hinted at in the word לאמור as being דברי כבושים בשבילכם, "words of rebuke for your sake G'd communicates to me, etc.," this refers to Deuteronomy 2,16 where Moses told the people that G'd had resumed speaking with him using the friendly term אמירה only after all the people who were 20 years and over when the spies returned from their ill-fated misssion had died. This was 38 years after the moment described in our portion. This comment is in line with what I have said. The only difference is that Torat Kohanim derives the entire exegesis from the word לאמור, without dissecting the verse as carefully as we have done. מTorat Kohanim states there that in the event we thought that G'd communicated with Moses because of His own concerns we should know לאמור, that it was only on account of the Israelites. The Midrash means that the word לאמור is to be understood as a מעוט, an exclusion. G'd made it clear that He would not have spoken to Moses on that occasion were it not for the fact that He did so for the benefit of the people, i.e. He wanted to speak to them. This teaches that the whole purpose of G'd speaking to Moses from the Tabernacle was in order for Moses to communicate sections of the Torah to the people. When we are told in Avot 1,1 that Moses received the Torah at Sinai and he delivered it to Joshua, etc., this means that Moses handed over the entire tradition; he neither omitted any part nor added something of his own. Every secret G'd had entrusted to Moses, Moses in turn faithfully communicated to the leader of the next generation. Israel are compared to Moses when it came to Torah knowledge, the only difference being that Moses had received the Torah directly from G'd.

דבר אל בני ישראל ואמרת, "Speak to the children of Israel and say to them, etc." The first difficulty is the repetitive: "דבר ואמרת," speak and say!" Besides, why did G'd not say אמור ואמרת, but changed the instructions in mid-stream from דבר, harsh-sounding instruction, to ואמרת, i.e. a softer approach? The answer is that in this communication G'd issued legislation concerning two different kinds of sacrificial offerings. The first kind of offering mentioned here is one which is prompted by man's goodwill towards G'd, his desire to donate a free-will offering, the עולה, the burnt-offering. The second legislation deals with a sin-offering, a mandatory offering, the result of the owner having committed an inadvertent sin which requires him to obtain atonement. The word דבר, the relatively harsh form of communication applied to the legislation about the sin-offering, whereas the word ואמרת was used when telling the people the rules about the burnt-offering. Alternatively, we can recognise in this differential two separate aspects of the sin-offering legislation. The sin-offering is referred to by the word אמירה seeing G'd has declared Himself ready to accept a sheep, or in the worst case, an ox, as atonement for man's sin; on the other hand, the harsher דבר is justified inasmuch as man should not have committed such a sin, even inadvertently. The basic penalty for the sin in question is the death of the sinner. It is a sobering thought that an animal had to die to atone for man's mistake.

The Torah addresses בני ישראל. According to Torat Kohanim this expression is to exclude the practice of סמיכה, the owner of the sacrificial animal placing his weight on the animal before it is slaughtered, when such an animal is offered by a non-Jewish owner (something which will be mentioned shortly in this legislation). The word בני, is to exclude בנות, females, from this requirement. The word ואמרת is supposed to restrict the procedure of סמיכה to peace-offerings. This is difficult to understand seeing the expression אמירה is perceived as something additional to דבר, i.e. as inclusive, not exclusive. Although the author of Korban Aharon claims that the word לאמור would have taught us the lesson it did even if the word דבר had not occurred at the beginning of this verse, I beg to differ. Without the words דבר אל בני ישראל at the beginning of this verse I could not have deduced what I did from the word לאמור in the previous verse. There would have been no exegetical value to the word דבר seeing it was needed for the basic message the Torah is trying to convey.

Perhaps the author of Torat Kohanim felt that seeing it is not clear which of the two words דבר ואמרת was to be used exegetically and which was needed for the basic message, it was in order to use either word exegetically. Alternatively, Torat Kohanim did not mean to focus on the word דבד at all but on the words בני ישראל. Seeing that the Torah could have written דבר אליהם instead of דבר אל בני ישראל, the extra words are available for exegetical purposes. It was quite obvious that Moses was to address the Israelites and not anyone else. By saying בני, the Torah excluded females as the Torah should have written דבר אל בית ישראל if it intended to include women in the requirement to perform סמיכה. The word ישראל excluded the סמיכה requirement from Gentiles offering sacrifices to G'd. Nonetheless, the alternative we offered earlier is more likely to be the correct one, seeing that somewhere in the commentary by Torat Kohanim it is argued that the words בני ישראל refer to the nation who had a Covenantal relationship with G'd, something which is related to its interpretation of the line אדם כי יקריב מכם, i.e. that the word אדם includes Gentiles.

אדם כי יקריב מכם, "when any man of you brings an offering, etc." Why did the Torah have to use the term אדם? Whereas Torat Kohanim here claims that the word includes offerings brought by proselytes as being acceptable, the author of Korban Aaharon asks what need there was for the Torah to specifically include proselytes seeing we have a ruling in Menachot 73 that even sacrifices from Gentiles are acceptable. This ruling is based on either exegesis or logic derived from Leviticus 22,18. The author of Korban Aharon suggests as an answer that we could have assumed that once the proselyte had converted he would become subject to the same restriction that the Israelites themselves are subject to as a result of the Torah writing בני ישראל….כי יקריב מכם, i.e. that not all the Israelites are entitled to offer such sacrifices. The word אדם then would confirm that sacrifices are accepted from all proselytes. I do not find this answer as grammatically tenable. Had the Torah not written the word אדם in our verse which included proselytes, the Talmud would not have been able to include Gentiles based on the wording איש איש in Leviticus 22,18, but would have included only proselytes as allowed to offer vows and gift-offerings. This is why the author of Torat Kohanim chose our verse as the basis for the ruling that offerings from proselytes are acceptable. This is the only reason that the formulation איש איש in Leviticus 22,18 may be interpreted as a directive to include Gentiles. Once we are clear about this there is no need to come up with forced explanations to justify the Torat Kohanim as does the author of Korban Aharon.

One cannot object that seeing that according to Baba Metzia 114 only Israelites are called אדם and not Gentiles, that therefore the words איש איש in 22,18 must refer to proselytes seeing the beginning of that verse specifically addressed Israelites and that it would not have occurred to anyone to include Gentiles so that they needed to be excluded specifically. Once we use the verse to expand the group of people from whom sacrificial offerings are acceptable we do not include every category of person but we include the group of people most closely resembling natural-born Israelites, i.e. the proselytes. Only if we find another word in the text which suggests that some other group of people is to be included in this legislation do we use it to include Gentiles. As a result, the law is that the proselyte may bring any kind of sacrificial offering whereas the Torah permits the Gentile only certain types of offerings. Rabbi Akiva holds that the Gentile may only bring a burnt-offering, עולה, whereas Rabbi Yossi Haglili holds that Gentiles may also offer a gift-offering, מנחה (Menachot 73).

Midrash Tanchuma item 8 on our portion asks why the Torah used the expression אדם in our verse in preference to the customary איש? The answer given is that the Torah wishes to establish a parallel with the first human being who had sinned, i.e. אדם. We may understand the verse as follows: כי יחטא אדם כמו אדם הראשון שהתחיל לחטא יקריב קרבן; "If someone sins as did Adam who was the first human being who sinned, he shall offer a sacrifice." It appears from the wording of the author of the Tanchuma that Adam's sin was inadvertent seeing sin-offerings are acceptable only for sins committed inadvertently. The Midrash corresponds to what I have written on Genesis 3,12 on the words: "she gave to me." The entire פרשה here teaches us that G'd applied a different yardstick to man after Adam had sinned initially. Whereas the penalty for Adam's sin had been death, i.e. mortality, and the fact that he offered a sin-offering did not absolve him of his guilt, such offerings will help the Israelites to atone for the sins they commit inadvertently. The Tanchuma supplied the reason why G'd did not accept Adam's sacrifice as sufficient atonement, i.e. he had been the first human to sin; the evil urge had not been an integral part of him so that it would have been difficult to resist the lure of that urge. All subsequent human beings have been afflicted in that evil has become part of their life-force, נפש. The אות הברית, the sign of the covenant between us and G'd, i.e. the need to remove the foreskin through the act of circumcision, is the proof of the cardinal difference between us and Adam who had been created minus the foreskin.

I believe that this consideration helps to explain a verse in Job 33,29 according to which G'd gives man two or three chances before decreeing something final resulting in his death. Why was Adam not measured by that yardstick? In fact, when it comes to sins committed by a community of people, we know on the authority of Amos 2,1, that G'd will forgive Israel's sins three times and only on the fourth occasion will He no longer forgive. There is, however, a good reason why G'd did not apply the yardsticks mentioned in either Job or Amos to אדם הראשון, the first man. On the day G'd created Adam He made him of totally good components, so that no part of him was either mentally or physically worthless which would cause him to go astray. Once he sinned he became the prototype of a sinner and the evil his life-force, נפש had absorbed became a part of every subsequent Israelite's body and soul. Even man's body absorbed that vestige of sin and the reminder of that contamination is the foreskin with which males are born. Keeping in mind that we all suffer from a handicap Adam had not suffered from, G'd decided to allow man up to three repetitions of mortal sins before making a decree final. It is man's heritage from the moment he emerges from his mother's womb to be infected with this evil pollutant. This pollutant endeavours to make man sin intentionally. It also endeavours to make him sin through mere thoughtlessness. In this latter case, the sin-offering helps to secure penitent Man atonement for such thoughtlessness. Although it is true that Adam's sin was also due to thoughtlessness, G'd dealt fairly with him by not allowing him a second chance seeing he did not have to overcome a spiritual or physical pollutant which urged him to disobey his Maker.

כי יקריב מכם, "when one of you brings an offering, etc." We need to analyse why the Torah had to write the word מכם, "from you." Besides, why is that word written after the Torah had already written the predicate of the verse, i.e. "who offers a sacrifice." Normally, the subject, i.e. the person who performs the act is mentioned before the act he performs. Our sages in Chulin 5 state that the word מכם is intended to exclude Jewish heretics whose offerings are not acceptable. They arrive at this conclusion by viewing the word מן הבהמה, as suggesting that sacrifices by a heretic are aceptable. How was such an exegesis arrived at? The word מכם excluded only a Jew who either practices idolatry, (seeing this sin is equivalent to violation of all the Torah's commandments), or the kind of heretic who rejects all of the Torah's commandments. The wording מן הבהמה, on the other hand, suggests another group of animal-like human beings, i.e. heretics who reject only one or several of the commandments. The Torah says that these sinners do qualify for offering of sacrifices. The translation of the verse would be: "a certain animal-like person amongst you who offers a sacrifice, etc." The exegesis offered in Chulin helps to explain why the word מכם in our verse appears after the predicate instead of before. If the Torah had written: אדם מכם, in that sequence, the word would have appeared to exclude something instead of including something, or vice-versa. The intention of the verse, however, was that inclusions should apply only to proselytes, whereas exclusions should apply only to certain members of the Jewish community. The Torah achieved this aim by positioning the words כי יקריב between the words אדם מכם. We may also justify the position of the word מכם through reference to a different exegetical approach on the same folio of the Talmud. There the Talmud quotes a Baraitha which understands the word מכם as excluding offerings by heretics, and another Baraitha which uses the words מעם הארץ, (Leviticus 4,27)i.e. "from certain types of עם הארץ not from all of them," as the basis for not accepting sacrifices from such individuals. Rabbi Shimon disagrees saying that the words אשר לא תעשינה ואשם at the end of that verse make it clear that only an unrepentant heretic is not allowed to offer sacrifices. [Seeing that it seems strange that according to the first view even a repentant heretic should be forbidden to offer a sacrifice, Ed.], the Talmud defines the difference between the two views as applying only when someone who remains guilty of eating forbidden fat has repented for eating blood, and offers a sin-offering to achieve atonement for that sin. According to the first view, such an offering would be acceptable, whereas according to the second view it would not as the sinner continues to practice his heresy by eating forbidden fat. The Talmud there adds that one of the verses (1,2) speaks of the acceptance of a burnt-offering from a heretic, whereas the other verse (in Leviticus 4,27) speaks of the acceptance of a sin-offering from a heretic and that we need the exegetically usable words or letters of both verses. Thus far the T almud.

Our sages have said in Torat Kohanim that the words כי יקריב refer only to voluntary offerings. This makes sense in view of the word מכם appearing after the words כי יקריב. The offerings which are excluded are voluntary offerings such as fulfilments of vows, i.e. עולה. This is what the Talmud in Chulin 5 meant when it said one verse speaks of the burnt-offering. Logic might have persuaded us that the Torah is willing to accept a free-will offering from a sinner who has not repented a specific sin, whereas a sin-offering from such a sinner would be rejected. The Torah therefore had to tell us that no offering is acceptable until the sinner has repented all of his sins. At the same time we also need the exclusion implied in the words מעם הארץ in 4,27 where the Torah speaks of a need to bring a sin-offering. The exclusion in that chapter is quite different from that in chapter one in that the only person from whom we do not accept a burnt-offering is the heretic who rejects the whole Torah. In 4,27, however, the Torah excludes sin-offerings even from a Jew who habitually only violates a single one of the 613 commandments when such a Jew wishes to offer a sin-offering for a different commandment which he violated unintentionally. Maimonides rules similarly in chapter three of his treatise on Maaseh Hakorbanot.

If we wish to see a moral-ethical dimension in this verse we may pursue the following path. Seeing that the Jewish people had observed that G'd had brought Moses close to him, and called out only to him from amongst all the Israelites, the Torah goes on record to say that such distinctions are not restricted to Moses, but אדם כי יקריב, "anyone who wishes to come close to G'd, can do so provided מכם, is a member of the Jewish people." In fact, as we have already pointed out, G'd's call to Moses was only for the sake of the Israelites, for their benefit. Consider the fact that during 38 years of wandering in the desert when the Israelites were sullen [due to the decree that they would perish in the desert after adopting the majority report of the spies Ed.], and G'd kept His distance from them, G'd had not spoken even with Moses. This was clear evidence that when G'd had spoken to Moses out of the Tabernacle it had been for the benefit of the people and not for either G'd's or Moses' benefit.

The Torah also wanted to give a hint to the elite amongst the people to influence the hearts of the Israelites so that they would worship G'd willingly. The reason that the offering or sacrifice is called קרבן, i.e. from the root קרב, "to come near," is that it is sin which separates man from his Father in Heaven. We know from Deuteronomy, 4,4 that "you who have cleaved to the Lord are all alive this day." The Israelites instead had become separated and distant from the presence of G'd, the שכינה, due to their support for the spies' report and their attempt to return to Egypt. G'd, on the other hand, is anxious to establish a close bond with Israel and commanded the elite to rebuke the sinner in order to bring his heart closer to the Lord his G'd. At the same time G'd punished those who ignored their duty in this regard. A proof that G'd indeed expects those who are the elite to take a leading role in influencing the hearts of the people, is found in the statement by our sages in Avot 5,21: "He who leads the multitude in righteousness shall have no sin come into his hand," seeing G'd will protect him against committing errors. These then are the messages contained in our verse.

The word אדם used by the Torah here refers to the spiritually most advanced members of society, the elite. Zohar Tazria interprets the sequence of the words כי יקריב מכם, as "whom does one try and bring close to G'd, the מכם, the ones who have not been close in the first place, i.e. the spiritually lower level of society who have sinned and asked G'd not to bother them with His demands so that they could withdraw from the close bond with G'd." These are the people for the elite to focus on, to try and bring them back closer to G'd. This is why the Torah adds the words קרבן לשם, to be close to G'd, so that they will become what G'd called in the words of Isaiah 60,21: "the shoot that I planned, My handiwork in which I glory." A person of that calibre, involved in bringing others closer to G'd does not have to bring either free-will offerings or sin-offerings. Having finished with describing the task of the elite of the Jewish people, the Torah continues: מן הבהמה תקריבו את קרבנכם, i.e. the ordinary people are to offer their various kinds of sacrifices; after all, not everyone is on the spiritual level of those described as אדם, i.e. able to restore harmonious relations between sinners and G'd.

אם עולה קרבנו, if his offering consists of a burnt-offering, etc. Why is the wording of the Torah different here from the verses in which the burnt-offerings consisting of either sheep or fowl are described? In both those instances the Torah writes: ואם מן הצאן קרבנו, or ואם מן העוף קרבנו, whereas here the Torah writes: אם עולה קרבנו? If the Torah wanted to be consistent it should have written: אם מן הבקר עולה. We may understand this in conjunction with an idea mentioned in Torat Kohanim (3,20) in connection with the word את קרבנכם at the end of the last verse. We are told there that the Torah speaks of communal burnt-offerings. This would account for the plural ending in the word קרבנכם. In the other two instances we have mentioned the Torah uses the singular ending, i.e. קרבנו, making it plain that the Torah speaks of sacrifices offered by individuals. Moreover, the Torah uses the conditional אם, if, when introducing the burnt-offering to tell us that the only kind of communal burnt-offering acceptable is the one which consists of בקר, a male member of the cattle category. Peace-offerings may not be offered as communal offerings. [Peace-offerings are offerings which are eaten in the main by the owners, whereas the burnt-offering is completely consumed by the altar except for the skin and the hair. Ed.] Furthermore, the sequence קרבנכם אם עולה suggests that only burnt-offerings are acceptable as communal offerings and not peace-offerings as stated in Torat Kohanim.

Furthermore, if the Torah had been consistent and written: אם מן הבקר עולה, we would have concluded that only animals which belong to the category of בקר, cattle, are acceptable as burnt-offerings and that sheep, etc., would be unacceptable as burnt-offerings. As a result of such considerations the Torah wrote the words אם עולה in that order to make it plain that there are other alternatives. Both cattle and sheep are acceptable as burnt-offerings, albeit communal burnt-offerings have to be of the בקר variety. Individual burnt-offerings on the other hand, may consist of either cattle or sheep. In order that we should not err concerning the acceptability of burnt-offerings consisting of certain kinds of fowl, the Torah added the word קרבנו once more (1,14) although this was not strictly necessary as pointed out in Torat Kohanim which understands the word as precluding communal burnt-offerings consisting of birds even when these communal offerings are in the nature of נדבה, voluntary offerings.

The wording of the Torat Kohanim (3,21) is: "Why did the Torah have to repeat the word עולה, burnt-offering, once more?" Answer: "I could have concluded that all the exclusions we have learned from the previous verses apply only to burnt-offerings which are voluntary offerings but that in the case of mandatory offerings they do not apply; hence the Torah repeats the word אם עולה to teach that the restrictions which we have learned about do not distinguish between voluntary and mandatory burnt-offerings." This concludes our quote from Torat Kohanim. It appears that the author of the Torat Kohanim thought that the Torah should have written: אם קרבנו עולה, "if his sacrifice is a burnt-offering." They answered that if the Torah had written the words in that sequence we would have assumed that the Torah spoke of a voluntary offering, an עולת נדבה, seeing that the words כי יקריב, definitely imply that the owner of that animal has a choice in the matter. The words אם עולה then mean any kind of עולה, any kind of burnt-offering be it a mandatory one or a voluntary one. The ראב"ד argues that the word עולה here was superfluous as the Torah could have relied on the next appearance of that word in the next verse. I consider this very forced.

קרבנו, his offering. Torat Kohanim views this word as including the above-mentioned restrictions as applicable also to peace-offerings. If not for the word קרבנו I would have understood that the peace-offering is not subject to the same restrictions as the burnt-offering. Therefore this word is meant to include peace-offerings in the restrictions applicable to the burnt-offerings. There was never any reason to assume that peace-offerings should be subject to such restrictions in the first place so that the Torah had to counter that impression. [The fact that female animals are acceptable as peace-offerings as opposed to burnt-offerings which are restricted to male animals, lends substance to that assumption. Ed.] The author of Torat Kohanim did not use the pronoun ending קרבנו instead of קרבן as the basis for its exegetical comment as he did so already in verse 10 when the Torah speaks about the burnt-offering consisting of sheep or goats.

את הכל. all of it. Torat Kohanim claims that the word הכל specifically includes the hooves and the horns of the animal. In view of this, we must ask why Abraham did not include the horns of the ram he offered in lieu of Isaac (Genesis 22,14), leaving the horns to be used as shofarot as described in Pirke de Rabbi Eliezer chapter 31. Perhaps we have to assume that Abraham did indeed offer, i.e. put the entire ram on the altar, and that due to the heat the horns פקעו מעל המזבח, cracked and fell off the altar; we learned in Zevachim 86 that once parts of the burnt-offering fell off the altar they do not need to be put back on.

Another possibility is that the horns were separated from the ram prior to sprinkling its blood on the altar. Horns, etc., are not included as fit to be burned on the altar unless they are still attached to the body of the animal in question. If they have been detached, they have to be removed from the altar even if they had been placed on it already as we know from Deut. 12,27: ועשית עלותיך הבשר והדם על מזבח השם. According to Rabbi Zeyrah who stated in Zevachim 86 that the parts which had fallen off the altar are permitted for private use if they had been detached from the body prior to the sprinkling of the blood on the altar, one may fashion handles for knives from such horns.

Another way of solving our question is that seeing the Torah had not been given as yet during Abraham's lifetime, the details recorded here did not obligate him. It is true that our sages in Yuma 28 held that Abraham carried out all the minutiae of the commandments. This included ערובי תבשילין, i.e. pre-cooking some food for the Sabbath following a festival on the eve of the festival in order to make preparation of food on the festival for the Sabbath permissible. I have already explained that Abraham did so voluntarily, in order to accumulate merits, not because he was under any obligation to do so. The same reasoning [that the Torah had not yet been given. Ed.] applied when Tamar married Yehudah her father-in-law, or when Jacob married two sisters while both were alive. The fact that the ram was stuck in the thicket by its horns was in itself a supernatural event; Abraham certainly did not have to burn up these very horns, a commandment applicable only in the future.

ואם מן הצאן קרבנו, If his offering consists of the category of sheep or goats, etc. Torat Kohanim remarks cryptically that the word ואם, in this verse [actually I think it would be better to say "the letter ו in the word ואם," Ed.] informs us of something additional to what we have learned about the עולה. What the author of Torat Kohanim means is that all the details mentioned in connection with a burnt-offering consisting of cattle and not repeated in this paragraph are nonetheless also applicable when the burnt-offering consists of צאן. Examples are the need to perform סמיכה, etc. This word ואם is also used to deduce that rules which are mentioned here for the first time, such as that the sheep used as burnt-offering is to be slaughtered on the northern side of the altar, apply equally to burnt-offerings consisting of cattle. The basic exegetical approach of Torat Kohanim is to use all those words which appear to be repeated unnecessarily for a halachic דרוש.

Torat Kohanim concludes: "why did the Torah then interrupt the previous paragrah and write a new paragraph altogether [if we treat the letter ו as making a single paragraph out of the two for exegetical purposes. Ed]? Answer: "in order to give Moses a breather during which time he could assimilate all the information he had just been given." Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi questions that apparently Torat Kohanim would not have queried the fact that verses 10-13 are a new paragraph if the Torah had not introduced it with the letter ו in the word ואם. How is this possible, he asks, seeing that the same Torat Kohanim on verse 1 (3,1) which deals with the meaning of the word ויקרא wrote as follows: "I might have thought that a "call" preceded every communication to Moses even including the separate paragraphs, הפסקות? Therefore the Torah wrote וידבר, to teach us that "calls" preceded דבור but not every paragraph which was a brief interruption of the same communication. What were the reasons for these הפסקות, brief interruptions? To give Moses a chance to assimilate the information he had been taught in the previous paragraph. Thus far the Torat Kohanim." This proves that such הפסקות, short intervals between different parts of the same communication, served to give Moses a breather even when the Torah did not introduce them by an otherwise superfluous letter ו. Rabbi Mizrachi proceeds to answer the question he posed. His words do not appeal to me. [The author refers to the question of Rabbi Mizrachi; he does not even relate to his answer to a question he does not perceive to have any merit in the first place. Ed.]

I believe that when Torat Kohanim on verse 1 stated that unless the Torah had linked the paragraphs by an otherwise superfluous letter ו in our paragraph, I would have concluded that the reason for the הפסקה was not to enable Moses to assimilate the information G'd had given him but to warn Moses not to arrive at הלכות by a merely exegetical approach. The fact that the Torah introduced our paragraph with the word ואם, teaches that identical rules apply to a burnt-offering consisting of cattle and one consisting of sheep. What was mentioned in paragraph one applies to paragraph two, and what was recorded for the first time in paragraph two applies to what has not been recorded in paragraph one. Seeing that this is so, it is clear that the purpose of the pause must have been to give Moses a chance to assimilate all this information. [After Moses heard the second paragraph he had to apply the new information contained in that paragraph as additional to what G'd had revealed to him in the first paragraph. This obviously took some time. Ed.] The author of Torat Kohanim spoke about not just this particular paragraph commencing in verse ten, but about paragraphs and their purposes altogether.

והקריב הכהן את הכל והקטיר, "and the priest shall offer it all and burn it up, etc." We have been told the very same thing already in the first paragraph dealing with the burnt-offering consisting of cattle. Why then did the Torah have to write this line? We cannot say that inasmuch as sheep are covered with wool the Torah wanted to include the wool in the part of the animal to be burnt up and that we could not have deduced the wool on the head of the ram and the hair of the beard of the billy-goat without a special verse, and that all these details could not have been derived from the word הכל in verse nine. The fact is that Torat Kohanim (4,57) derives the inclusion of these various kinds of animal hair in what is to be burned up from the word הכל in verse nine! Therefore, according to what we have stated that any detail applicable to burnt-offerings involving cattle applies also to burnt-offerings involving sheep, there was no need for the Torah to write a special verse containing this information! Furthermore, in our verse here the word הכל appears only next to the expression הקרבה, not to the הקטרה, the burning up of all these parts on the altar; our sages here in Torat Kohanim claim that the position of the word הכל teaches that only a priest may perform this service (bringing the animal to be burnt onto the altar), something we could not have deduced from what was written in verse 9. This makes the argument that the words from והקטיר המזבחה onwards in our verse are superfluous even stronger.

I believe we can best explain the reason for these words here by reference to what Torat Kohanim wrote on the words והקטיר המזבחה in our verse. I quote: "he shall burn it up even though it may have become disqualified, even though it may have left the precincts of the Tabernacle (courtyard), even though the priest offering it may have had the wrong thoughts (פגול) already during the earlier stages of offering this sacrifice, and even if it had become ritually defiled. As a result of all these inclusions I might have concluded that the burning up ceremony should take place regardless of whether the disqualifying factors had occurred before the animal was on the altar or while it was still below the altar; therefore the Torah writes והקטיר המזבחה, he is to burn it up only if it had already been on top of the altar."

It is difficult to know what is the source for the author of Torat Kohanim to derive the ruling that even if the sacrifice was already disqualified the priest must still burn up its parts. The author of Korban Aharon, aware of this problem, wrote that the fact that the Torah did not write והקטירם, "and he is to burn them up" [seeing the Torah had already written "all" concerning the הקרבה Ed.] is the source of the ruling by Torat Kohanim. If this were correct the author of Korban Aharon should have reacted similarly to the word והקריב instead of והקריבם. According to Korban Aharon, Torat Kohanim should have ruled that the priest ought to proceed with the offering in spite of the animal having suffered the kinds of disqualifications which did not affect the need for its being burned up. Seeing he did not do so, he cannot derive any הלכות, religious rulings, from the missing letter ם in the word והקריב either. The correct answer is that the author of Torat Kohanim arrives at his conclusion based on the unnecessary repetition of the word והקטיר first in verse 9 and then again in verse 13. This brings us back to our original question why this whole line beginning with the word והקטיר in verse 13 had to be written at all. That line should have appeared either in verse 9 or in verse 13 but not in both verses. The very fact that the line is superfluous entitles Torat Kohanim to use it exegetically.

עולה הוא. it is a burnt-offering. Torat Kohanim interprets the extraneous word הוא as making the slaughtering of animals to be offered as a burnt-offering on the northern side of the altar mandatory, i.e. unless the animal had been slaughtered on that side of the altar it could not be offered as a total-offering. This is the reason the Torah wrote this extraneous word only in the paragraph in which the northern side of the altar has already been mentioned, i.e. in verse 11. Clearly, the exclusion implied in the word הוא is related only to what was stated in verse 11, and there was no need to write the word הוא in the paragraph discussing a burnt-offering consisting of cattle which also discussed the need for סמיכה, the placing of the owner's weight on the animal prior to it being slaughtered. Had the word הוא occurred in that paragraph, we would have had to conclude that the act of סמיכה was mandatory and that failure to perform it would have disqualified that animal from becoming a burnt-offering. Actually, we have used the occurrence of the equally extraneous word עולה in verse 9 to establish that the act of סמיכה, i.e. the owner of the sacrifice placing his entire weight on the animal prior to its being slaughtered is not mandatory. We noted that the text hinted at some of the exclusions and inclusions respectively in the first paragraph, whereas other inclusions and exclusions respectively are hinted at in the second paragraph. We had stipulated that they all apply equally to both burnt-offerings consisting of cattle and of sheep, etc.; nonetheless there is something different about this particular exclusion which invalidates the premise concerning these two details of the burnt-offering regulations which we adhered to thus far. The two words עולה הוא, both of which are extraneous, refer to two separate commandments, i.e. the need for סמיכה, and the need to slaughter the burnt-offering on the northern side of the altar. We are therefore faced with the dilemma which of the extraneous words should serve exegetically for which of these two commandments. When we are faced with such a dilemma it is no more than reasonable to apply the extraneous word which appears next to an exclusion in its context, and the other extraneous word which appears next to an inclusion in its context. The word הוא in verse 13 is used exegetically as defining the commandment of where the animal is to be slaughtered since it appears in the text close to that commandment, whereas the word עולה which first appears in the text close to the inclusion of the סמיכה requirement is used exegetically as defining that requirement.

Torat Kohanim supplies an additional reason for using the word עולה which is inclusive as applicable to the rules of סמיכה, and the word הוא which is restrictive to the rules about where the animal must be slaughtered. Seeing that the rule of סמיכה is not even an initial requirement for all kinds of burnt-offerings, -burnt-offerings brought on behalf of the public not requiring סמיכה at all,- it is reasonable to assume that even when required initially, such a regulation should not be so essential that its absence would invalidate the offering. The requirement to slaughter a burnt-offering on the northern side of the altar applies to all kinds of burnt-offerings, however. It is possible that Torat Kohanim was unduly expansive in its exegetical use of this detail; the reason we have stated was quite adequate already. Even though the two paragraphs in question deal with one basic subject, the fact that there was room for some doubt makes it justifiable to write something extraneous. You will find, for instance, that the words עולה הוא occur again in connection with a burnt-offering consisting of a bird (1,17); in that instance Torat Kohanim uses the word עולה inclusively; even if the blood had only been squeezed out of the bird's body and not out of its head, it is still acceptable as a burnt-offering in that condition. The word הוא is again interpreted as restrictive, i.e. if the blood of that bird had been sqeezed out of its head and not out of its body, it is not acceptable as a burnt-offering. Zevachim 66 asks on this interpretation מאי תלמודא? "what is the logic behind this kind of exegesis?" The Talmud's answer is that seeing most of the blood is in the body and not in the head, squeezing the blood out of the body is more important. We see from there that the Talmud too fell back on logic in order to resolve something that had been in doubt, i.e. where to apply the words עולה and הוא respectively as inclusive and where to apply them as restrictive.