Parasha: Matot · Aliyah: First (Chesed)

אל ראשי המטות, to the leaders of the tribes, etc. What is so different about this commandment that Moses assembled the chiefs of the tribes to inform them of it and that they in turn were to tell the Israelites? Sifri claims that seeing in Numbers 10,3 in connection with the trumpets the congregation was mentioned before the leaders, and Moses was afraid that this would be misinterpreted to mean that the congregation at large took precedence over the princes, he made sure in 10,4 that the princes were referred to as the heads of the congregation. Moses did something similar here when he addressed the heads of the tribes first. In Nedarim 78 we are told that the reason the heads of the tribes are mentioned here was to hint that vows may be dissolved by a lone judge if he is an expert in the subject. All these comments are strictly allegorical. We need to understand also why the Torah writes המטות לבני ישראל. All Moses had to say was מטות בני ישראל. What is the reason for the extra letter ל? We must assume that the reason for the extra letter is to avoid a misunderstanding. Had the Torah not written לבני ישראל, we might have thought that the legislation was aimed only at the leaders of the people. By writing the extra letter ל, the Torah ensured that we would understand the legislation as applying to the leaders of the people as well as to the nation at large. The absence of the letter ו in front of לבני ישראל is not significant as the Torah has omitted that letter on frequent occasions where we would have expected it such as in Exodus 1,2 ראובן, שמעון, etc.

I have come across a Baraitha in Baba Batra 120 which goes as follows: "I might have thought that Moses said this paragraph only to the princes; to prevent me from thinking this the Torah wrote זה הדבר, 'this is the thing, etc.' We have the same expression in Leviticus 17,2 where the subject is the prohibition to slaughter animals for their meat and eat them unless they had first been offered as sacrifices in the Tabernacle. This legislation applies to all the people as it is is phrased: 'any man who, etc.' We therefore use the expression זה הדבר which appears on both occasions to conclude that the legislation in our paragraph also applies to all the men of Israel." Thus far the Talmud. Granted that the exegesis of this is valid, why did the Torah then have to add the words לבני ישראל, in our verse? Clearly the Baraitha did not understand the words לבני ישראל to mean that the legislation applied to the entire people why else would it have bothered to prove this indirectly by learning the גזרה שוה (similar wording) of זה הדבר in both instances? Moreover, the Talmud in Keritut 5 told us not to treat such a גזרה שוה lightly.

We also need to understand the meaning of the word לאמור? To whom were the Israelites to convey this legislation? If the Torah meant that the heads of the tribes were supposed to convey this legislation to the Israelites the Torah should have written לאמור לבני ישראל, "to tell to the children of Israel!" Furthermore, what precisely did the Torah want to exclude by using the word זה הדבר in verse 2?

I believe that we can understand our verse after recalling a statement in Chagigah 10. The Talmud says there: "the whole legislation of cancelling vows is like something which flies in the air (i.e. has no firm basis)." If so, we must investigate why the Torah treated this legislation so differently from any other legislation. Every other legislation has been spelled out in the written Torah whereas only this legislation is "left hanging in the air?"

I believe the reason is simple. The Torah did not feel comfortable with the thought that it would write outright that vows and oaths undertaken by an Israelite could be cancelled by a judge or even by a team of judges. If the Torah had spelled this out people would conclude that oaths and vows are meaningless as they can be cancelled so easily. The Torah therefore resorted to a clever stratagem by leaving the matter of evaluating a vow with a view to annulling it to the greatest minds of the nation. As far as the average Jew was concerned, the doors to annulment remained closed in order to encourage them to fulfil oral undertakings they had entered into. The operative clauses for keeping one's oral undertakings are: 1) לא יחל דברו, "he must not break his word (from the root 'to profane')," and 2) "he must fulfil what he has undertaken orally." The meter of the verse is as follows: "Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes and outlined the entire legislation to them. But to the rest of the children of Israel he only conveyed the following, i.e. זה הדבר." In other words, the people were to honour vows and oaths and not to fail to observe them; the tribal heads were given information about the instances when annulment might be considered. This then is what the Talmud meant in Chagigah 10 when it characterised this legislation as "flying in the air." This explanation solves all the questions we have raised earlier.

Another approach to our paragraph could be this: Moses told the heads of the tribes this whole legislation. He told the Israelites at large to honour their oral undertakings and to turn to the tribal heads in the event they had some problem in fulfilling their vows. The latter would then inform them if their specific vows could be annulled or not.

Having read all this you may wonder why our sages had to bother with exegetical methods such as a גזרה שוה, seeing the Torah did write the words: "to the children of Israel?" The answer is that the גזרה שוה really was not needed except to tell us that Moses personally said these things to Israel. As to the announcement of the legislation itself, no גזרה שוה was needed. This is what the sages meant with the statement "I could have thought that Moses personally related this legislation only to the heads of the tribes. To prevent me from erring, etc, etc." The sages were careful not to say: "I could have thought the legislation was not given except to the heads of the tribes."

Another possible reason why the גזרה שוה was needed may be that without it I would have understood the words לבני ישראל as a continuation of the words אל ראשי המטות, as if the Torah had written: "Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes of the children of Israel." The גזרה שוה of זה הדבר ensures that we understand the words לבני ישראל correctly. Do not ask that we ourselves have explained the word זה as restrictive, telling us that only part of the legislation was revealed directly to the Israelites. The exegesis of the גזרה שוה is not based on the common word זה, but on the common word הדבר which is not restrictive. Our exegesis is based on the word זה alone.

A moral/ethical approach would read together the words לאמור זה הדבר; this would reflect a teaching by Bamidbar Rabbah 22,1 where we are exhorted to be very circumspect with keeping vows and oaths. King Yannai owned two thousand asses and they all perished on account of a true oath [but an unnecessary one. Ed.] The example quoted in the Midrash has someone swear to his friend that he would consume a certain amount of food and drink in a certain place. Both parties went to that place and the one who had sworn the oath consumed the requisite amount of food and drink. A short while later all his asses perished. The moral lesson to be derived from this is that if G'd is so particular about a true but needless oath which a person swears, how much more particular will He be if someone perjures himself! In our paragraph the Torah goes on record that there are certain vows and oaths that G'd commands people to swear, i.e. לאמור זה הדבר, "to utter this word." לבני ישראל לאמור. According to Sanhedrin 56 the word לאמור is a reference to גלוי עריות, unchaste behaviour, illicit sex. [based on Jeremiah 3,1: לאמור הן ישלח איש את אשתו והלכה מאתו והיתה לאיש אחר, הישוב אליה עוד? הלא חנוף תחנף הארץ ההיא. "To say: 'if a man divorces his wife and she leaves him and marries another man, can he ever go back to her? Would not such a land be defiled?'" The unusual position of the word לאמור at the beginning of this verse leads to interpreting it as a "verbal under-taking" such as in marriage Ed.] In verse three the Torah uses the word איש to hint that "a man" who is able to control his carnal urges should employ the legislation of making vows to help him resist the evil urge to sleep with people forbidden to him. In other words, the vow entered into by a Nazirite who wants to reinforce his resolution to resist sexual temptation, is acceptable to G'd. We have a number of Midrashim discussing situations when Biblical personalities needed to reinforce their resolution to resist such temptation. (Ruth 3,13, Vayikra Rabbah 23,11, Psalms 119,106 "I have sworn an oath to keep Your just rules.")

איש כי ידור נדר, When a man vows a vow, etc. Why did the Torah repeat both the word נדר, vow, and the word שבעה, oath? Why could the Torah not simply have written איש כי ידור לה׳ או ישבע? Furthermore, why did the Torah phrase observance both in a positive and in a negative connotation, i.e. "he must not profane his word, as well as he must do in accordance with what came out of his mouth?" I believe we must look for the key to the way the Torah worded this legislation by remembering that there are two categories of vows and oaths. One category is related to a person's soul, i.e. he may undertake to study Torah, give a certain amount of charity, refrain from abominable practices, not to visit places predominantly visited by women, etc. The other category of vows and oaths pertains to the body and involves matters which are neither forbidden to us nor are we commanded to do them. Here too there are two divisions; one may vow to eat certain things, drink certain liquids, or live in a certain house, etc. Or, one may undertake on oath not to eat certain things, drink certain liquids, or wear certain clothes. G'd legislated here how a person should best conduct himself. The words כי ידור נדר, i.e. an ordinary vow involves an undertaking to go to a certain place or to perform a certain task. The addition of the word לה׳ means that different rules apply when the vow is not of a secular nature but relates to one's conduct vis-a-vis G'd. The addition of this word therefore means that the word נדר has not been repeated at all, but that once it applies to secular vows and once to religious vows.

The Torah goes on או השבע שבעה, "or he swears an oath, etc." In the first instance the oath concerns something one undertakes not to do as stated here לאסור אסר על נפשו, "to deny himself something." Here too we have two categories of oaths. One may swear not to do something which is already forbidden, as Boaz did when he wanted to reinforce his resolution not to sin by swearing an oath.

The Torah was very astute in separating the word "vow" from the word "oath" by interposing the word "to G'd," to alert us to the fact that the reason both the word נדר and the word שבעה have been repeated is to allude to vows or oaths of a religious nature. Such religious vows or oaths are not subject to the same rules which govern vows or oaths of a secular nature. The words לא יחל דברו, "he must not profane his word," refer to vows and oaths which involve abstaining from something of a purely secular nature such as Boaz' oath; the rule which applies is: "he must not break his word; however, a collegium of judges has the power to annul the vow or oath in question (compare Nedarim 14). With respect to vows involving matters of religious significance, such as declaring something sacred for use only by the Temple treasury, etc., or oaths of a religious nature, the words which are applicable are: "everything which his mouth has uttered he shall do."

Another reason why the Torah wrote the word לשם can be understood in light of Maimonides Hilchot Nedarim chapter 11. He writes that if a 12 year old boy has made a vow or sworn an oath, we examine him to find out if he is mature enough to have understood the significance of his undertaking, i.e. "to whom he made this undertaking." If so, he is held responsible just as an adult. The exegetical tool for this is the word איש before the legislation. The legislation applies to anyone who qualifies intellectually under the heading of איש, is mentally of age and realises his obligations vis-a vis G'd.

ושמע אביה את נדרה..וקמו כל נדריה, and her father hears about her vow;….all her vows shall stand." We need to understand why the verse first speaks about "her vow" in the singular and then continues to speak about "her vows" in the plural. Besides, why did the Torah add the word: "all" both times. It would have sufficed to write: "her vows and oaths will stand," without adding the word "all" each time. Furthermore, why does the Torah use a different future tense when speaking about her vows, i.e. וקמו, whereas when speaking about an oath the woman uttered, it uses the word יקום to indicate that "it will stand?" The word יקום was altogether superfluous as the word וקמו which appeared earlier in the same verse would have referred to both vow and oath.

We may be able to explain the wording the Torah used in our verse with the help of what we learned in Nedarim 87. The Mishnah says there: "If she said 'I swear that I will not eat either these figs or grapes,' and her husband confirms the part about her not eating figs, he has confirmed the entire vow. If the husband annulled the part of her vow concerning the figs, however she is still bound by the vow not to eat the grapes until her husband invalidates that part of her vow also. If she said: 'I swear not to eat these grapes, and I swear not to eat these figs,' she has made two separate vows.'" The Talmud explains that this Mishnah must be understood according to the view of Rabbi Yishmael who holds that the words אישה יקימנו ואישה יפרנו, "her husband may confirm it, or her husband may annul it," refer to the example cited in our Mishnah, that as long her husband has confirmed part of her vow he is considered as having confirmed the whole of it and his wife is bound to observe both parts of her vow. Rabbi Akiva, on the other hand, interprets the word יקימנו, to mean that the letters מנו in the word יקימנו (30,14) are to be understood as ממנו, "part of it.' He argues that just as her husband may confirm any part of her vow, so he may also annul any part of her vow so that partial confirmation equals total confirmation, so he only needs to annul part of her vow to invalidate all of it. Rabbi Yishmael counters that the Torah, after all, did not write ממנו, "a part of it?" Rabbi Akiva makes a conceptual comparison (מקיש) between invalidating a vow and confirming it. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees claiming that this is both Rabbi Yishmael's and Rabbi Akiva's approach, but that the other sages make the conceptual comparison between 1) confirming of a vow and 2) invalidating it. Just as in the case of invalidating a vow only the part of the vow which he has invalidated is affected, so when he has confirmed it only the part which he has actually confirmed is binding on his wife. The above is the version of our Talmud. Tossaphot, Ran and Nachmanides have a different version in which the conceptual comparison is reversed as follows: "Just as a partial annulment is not valid, so a partial confirmation is not valid (i.e. at all)." According to that version Rabbi Yishmael and the other sages share the same opinion. I believe that this is the correct version as is proved by the Tossephta.

As a result of what we have heard so far, we are faced with three possible approaches to the problem. 1) The view of Rabbi Yishmael quoted by Rabbi Yehudah Hanassi when he edited the Mishnah, that as long as the husband confirmed part of his wife's vow he confirmed all of it, whereas if he annulled only part of it, the only part which is annulled is the part which he spelled out. 2) The approach of Rabbi Akiva that whenever the husband either confirmed or annulled part of his wife's vow, he has in effect confirmed or annulled all of it. 3) The approach of the sages that any partial approval or partial annulment is legally invalid. The wording of our verse can be explained satisfactorily according to the view of each one of these three approaches.

Rabbi Yishmael's view as expressed in the text of the Mishnah understands the verse as follows: "and her father (or husband) hears about her vow (singular) teaches that the verse speaks about a woman who made a single vow such as when she lumps together the figs and the grapes saying only once: "I vow not to eat, etc." This excludes a situation where she used the words "I vow not to eat" more than once in relation to two or more items she vows to abstain from.

When the Torah continues about her vows (plural) remaining in force if her husband remained silent when he heard the vow, the Torah refers to the kind of vow mentioned at the end of the Mishnah when she said: "I vow not to eat these figs, and I vow not to eat these grapes," and the husband remained silent only concerning part of her vows. Concerning such a situation, the Torah continues: "if her father heard about it and remained silent, then all her vows are in force." The reason the Torah writes "all" is to tell us that even if the husband remained silent concerning only a single part of her vow(s) i.e. he did not oppose the vow not to eat figs, all her vows remain valid. What Rabbi Yishmael meant to tell us was that the word והחריש, "he remained silent," does not mean he has to remain silent concerning the entire vow in order for it to remain valid. Had the meaning of the word והחריש been total silence by the husband or father, the Torah would not have needed to tell us that all her vows remain valid. Who would have imagined that such vows would not remain valid? The Torah therefore must have wanted us to appreciate that the words והחריש לה did not mean total silence but objection to only part of her vows.

When the Torah continues וכל אסר..יקום, "and any prohibition will remain if force," this means that when the words "all her vows (pl)" were used, the Torah did not refer to the kind of vows in which each part was introduced with the preface "I will not eat, etc.," but to vows in which a number of prohibitions were all lumped together under a single heading of: "I will not eat such an such, such and such, etc." The fact that the Torah uses the term אסר in connection with the rule יקום is no problem as the laws for vows or oaths are interchangeable as we know from verse 3 where the Torah speaks of "or."

The reason the Torah writes יקום instead of merely relying on the word וקמו which preceded it in the same verse, is that in that event the word וקמו would have had to apply also to the case in our Mishnah where by uttering a single vow (formula) the woman included several matters she undertook to abstain from. I would then have misunderstood the meaning of the words והחריש לה, that "her husband remained silent." The word יקום in the singular is needed then to teach that the husband has to express his consent by silence to every part of the vow in order for it to be valid.

When the Torah continues: ואם הניא אביה אותה, "but if her father disallow her," the words כל נדריה, "all her vows" mean that he has to disallow all parts of her vow or vows in order to make his objection legal. If he only expressed objection to his daughter's vow not to eat the figs under discussion, his objection remains meaningless until he also objects to her abstaining from the grapes she vowed not to eat at the same time. The word לא יקום recurs at the end of verse 6 in the singular again to alert us to the fact that the Torah speaks about a single vow (with more than one part) such as at the beginning of the Mishnah from Nedarim we have quoted.

According to the view of Rabbi Akiva that objection to part of her vow invalidates the whole vow and that consent to part of her vow means consent to her entire vow, our verses have to be understood in the following manner: ושמע אביה….. והחריש, "if her father remains silent when he hears about her vows, etc," the word ושמע refers to his having heard only part of her vow and his having remained silent to what he heard. In such an event the Torah legislates וקמו כל נדריה, "all her vows are valid," i.e. even the parts of her vow which her father has never heard about. The Torah then continues: ואם הניא אביה אותה, "if her father disallows her," meaning that even if he disallows only part of her vow, as long as he disallows part of her vow he has exercised his authority in this respect concerning her whole vow. This is why there is no need to follow this up with the words כל נדריה, "all her vows, or her entire vow, i.e. every part of it." If the meaning had been that the father had to disallow all her vows in order to be legally effective, what need was there for the Torah to add the word אותה? Seeing that the Torah saw fit to write the word אותה, it is clear that this word belongs to what follows, i.e. to the words לא יקום, it does not remain valid (singular), to inform us that the father succeeded in annulling even the part of the vow he had not specifically objected to.

Once we follow this approach the words: "and G'd will forgive her" at the end of our verse (6) make excellent sense. Supposing her father had only heard that she vowed to abstain from figs and did not even know about her also having vowed to abstain from grapes, and the woman, unaware of her father's ignorance, had nonetheless violated her vow by eating the grapes she had vowed not to eat, then G'd's forgiveness is needed because as far as she was concerned she had sinned. The news the Torah conveys with the words: "and G'd wil forgive her" is that even in such a case G'd forgives her trespass. This has to be spelled out so that we understand that the object of G'ds forgiveness is an absence of knowledge on the woman's part which was the cause of her inadvertently eating what her husband had not allowed her to eat.

Finally, according to the view of the sages that neither partial confirmation nor partial disallowance of the woman's vow is legally effective, the verse has to be understood as follows: The Torah phrased the words: "if her father hears of her vow" in the singular to alert you to the fact that the subject is a single vow, i.e. a single declaration "I will abstain from, etc.," as oppposed to a situation when the woman made two vows as I have already explained in connection with the view of Rabbi Yishmael. The Torah continues with "and her father remains silent…her entire vow (i.e. all parts of her vow) will stand." The words כל נדריה, "all her vows" refer both to what was written immediately before and prior to that. The meter of the verse then is: "if her father remains silent, i.e. under which circumstance is his silence effective to keep her vows valid? Answer: if his silence covered all parts of her vow; however, if it covered only part of her vow his silence is legally quite ineffectual."

The Torah then continues: "if her father disallows her…all her vows will not stand." The words "all her vows" now refer to what the Torah had already spoken of, i.e. if his disallowance covers all parts of previously mentioned vows, or all parts of her previously mentioned vow; then she does not even have to honour any part of her vow. The Torah reminded us by use of these words that in the event the father's disallowance had failed to cover even a single part of her vow, the words לא יקום do not apply. Although we have also said that the words כל נדריה may be applied to what follows instead of to what had been written before, the wording still makes sense as we then interpret the words לא יקום as applying, provided that all her vows are included in the disallowance; in other words the futility of cancelling part of the vow or vows would not then apply and all her vows are cancelled. All of the above applies only when she had made only a single vow though this vow included several parts as we deduced from the words: "and her father has heard her vow (singular). If, however, she had made separate vows i.e. prefacing each clause with the words: "I swear I will abstain, etc." then cancellation of one vow has nothing to do with cancellation or confirmation of the other vow.

ואם הפר יפר אותם אישה, "But if her husband will surely declare her vow null and void, etc." In order to understand why the Torah repeated the word הפר and why the Torah wrote the words כל מוצא שפתיה, "everything which her lips uttered," can be understood with the help of Nedarim 82. We are told there in the name of Shemuel that "if she vowed not to eat two loaves of bread, and observing her vow concerning one of these loaves represents hardship for her, [i.e. it looks very appetizing Ed.] whereas abstaining from the other loaf does not represent any hardship for her, then, if the husband cancels the loaf which represents hardship, he automatically is also considered as having cancelled the vow not to eat the other loaf." It is such a situation which our verse envisaged when referring to two הפרות, cancellations, or breaching of the vow. Once the husband has cancelled the part of her vow which is subject to his prerogative to cancel, he has also cancelled the part which is not subject to his authority to cancel. [one must appreciate here that the husband's entire authority stems from the fact that if his wife suffers emotionally as a result of her vow, this disturbs the harmonious relationship between him and his wife. Ed.] The Torah goes on with כל מוצא שפתיה לא יקום, that none of her utterances are valid. This means that even if her husband disallowed those parts of her vow over which he has no legal authority, they become ineffective because he has already disallowed the parts over which he does have legal authority. According to the approach of Rav Assi who disagreed with this interpretation in Nedarim, claiming that the prerogative of the woman's husband extends only to the part of the vow which is burdensome for her and therefore potentially also for him, we would have to explain the words in this verse as follows: אם הפר, "if the husband disallows something which he is entitled to disallow," יפר, "his objection is legally valid;" it is not valid, however, concerning parts of his wife's vow which does not have the potential to bother him and which therefore is excluded from this whole legislation. The reason the Torah had to write both the word כל and the word נדריה was to inform us that even if the vow is made up of two parts only one of which is burdensome for the wife, the parts of the vow are lumped together for the purpose of disallowing it.

Our verse becomes clearer when we consider what the Mishnah says in Nedarim 87 [The subject is a husband or father who has failed to dissolve his wife's or his daughter's vow within the prescribed period of time because he was unaware of part of the legislation and who now explains his dilemma to a collegium of judges. Ed.] When someone says: "I am aware that there are regulations regarding the keeping of vows, but I was unaware of my right to disallow some such vows;" he is allowed to disallow the vow in question at the later date when he was told the regulations. Alternatively, this petitioner says: "I am aware that there are regulations concerning disallowing certain vows, but I was not aware of the regulations which pertain to keeping the vows." In such a case Rabbi Meir holds that the petitioner is not now allowed to disallow the vow in question whereas the sages hold that he is allowed to do so. Thus far the Mishnah. The words הפר יפר in our verse may refer to the situation discussed in the Mishnah we just quoted. In other words, even if the error concerned only the disallowing of the vow, if the husband disallows it belatedly because he was unaware of the law he may do so (in accordance with the view of the sages). As to the view of Rabbi Meir, the repetition of the words הפר יפר may be understood thus: "there are occasions when even after the time has elapsed we allow the husband or father to exercise the right to disallow his wife's or his daughter's vow which the Torah has provided; however this belated disallowing is only possible if the petitioner did not know that he possessed such a right at all." According to the view of Rabbi Meir, לנדריה means: "when is her husband able to disallow her vows even after the time set aside for this by the Torah has elapsed? If her husband did not make an error once he became aware of his rights under this legislation." According to the view of the sages, the word לנדריה would simply mean: "when he became aware of the nature of her vows." The word would then teach you that even though the husband's error concerned the vow itself and not his ability to disallow it, he is permitted to disallow it once he finds out that he had been in error.

ואם הפר יפר, "and if he surely decides to disallow, etc." This verse means that even when the vows he now decides to disallow are the type which he could have disallowed during the prescribed period, now that he has waited too long, he can no longer exercise his authority but must bear her guilt (if she violates her vow).